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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-3-102(3)(i),
78A-3-102(4), and 78A-4-103(2)0).
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review
Issue 1: The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could convict
Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the charge of
aggravated kidnapping, where the evidence at trial provided a rational basis for the jury
to conclude that Mrs. Zaragoza was not detained for any period of time longer than the
underlying assault, a conclusion inconsistent with kidnapping.
Standard of Review: "Whether a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is
appropriate presents a question of law." State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 10, 152 P.3d
315. When considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense jury
instruction, the Court must "view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the defense." Id. And "when the defendant requests a
jury instruction on a lesser-included offense, the requirements for inclusion of the
instruction 'should be liberally construed.'" Id (quoting State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1986)).
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 252:217-19.
Issue 2: The trial court erred when it concluded that the hearsay statements of
Mr. Zaragoza's wife were admissible on the ground that Mr. Zaragoza's conversations
with his wife while he was incarcerated prior to trial constituted wrongdoing such that he
forfeited his constitutional right to confront witnesses.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of Review: Applications of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, the
spousal testimonial privilege, and the Confrontation Clause are questions of law that this
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ^ 8, 232 P.3d 519; State v.
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, J 8. 218 P.3d 590.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 89-94; 250.
Determinative Provisions
The following determinative provisions are set forth at Addendum E.
U.S. Const, amend V.
U.S. Const, amend VI.
U.S. Const, amend XIV.
Utah Const, art. I, §7.
Utah Const, art. I, §12.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402.
Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Zaragoza raises two trial court errors: (i) the trial court incorrectly refused to

instruct the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated
kidnapping, and (ii) the trial court incorrectly ruled that Mr. Zaragoza's contact with his
wife prior to trial, including informing her of her spousal privilege, constituted
wrongdoing such that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Both of these errors were harmful and require a new trial.

-

The charges against Mr. Zaragoza arose from an incident that occurred at a
Motel 6 in June 2009. Mr. Zaragoza, his wife Christine, and their daughter E.G. had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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checked into a room with a friend, Raelynn Ortiz. (R. 251:109-10.) Mr. Zaragoza left in
the evening and returned the next morning, at which point Mr. Zaragoza allegedly
entered the room and assaulted Mrs. Zaragoza. (R. 251:68-69.) Based on what was
reported to police about the incident, Mr. Zaragoza was detained later that day and
ultimately charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and committing
domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R. 35-37, 251:61.)
Shortly before trial, Mrs. Zaragoza, through her independent counsel, notified the
trial court that she desired to invoke her constitutional spousal privilege so that she would
not have to testify against her husband. (R. 44-52.) Because she indicated she would be
unavailable at trial, the State moved the trial court for an order deeming admissible Mrs.
Zaragoza's prior out-of-court statements to police. (R. 70-88.) Because the admission of
testimonial hearsay violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the
State's motion was based on the theory that Mr. Zaragoza had forfeited his Confrontation
Clause rights by wrongfully procuring Mrs. Zaragoza's absence. (R. 75-83.) The court
agreed with the State and deemed the hearsay evidence admissible. (R. 272:100-06.)
The trial court based its conclusion on contact between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza
while Mr. Zaragoza was in jail pending trial. Although a protective order prevented such
contact during this time period, Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza spoke over the telephone and
when Mrs. Zaragoza visited her husband in jail. (R. 8, 272:102.) During the hearing on
the forfeiture issue, the trial court listened to recorded portions of three such telephone

3
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calls. (R. 272:48, 50, 61.)1 During those calls, Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza discussed the
status of his case, their hopes of reconciling if Mr. Zaragoza was ever released, Mrs.
Zaragoza's fear that she would never see him again, and Mr. Zaragoza9 s efforts at
rehabilitation—through both therapy and religion—while he was incarcerated.
(R. 272:65-67, 69-77.)
Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza also discussed Mrs. Zaragoza9s spousal testimonial
privilege. Mr. Zaragoza asked his wife whether she "know[s] the Constitution already,"
and when she responded that she does, he responded by acknowledging that she knows
then that the State " c a n ' t . . . force [her] to do nothing." (R. 226.) She told him that she
was afraid about invoking her privilege, and that she was "thinking of just writing a little
letter," and getting it notarized, and sending it off to "those three or four people that need
it." (R. 226-27.) He then suggested language the letter should contain about her decision
to invoke her constitutional rights, to which she responded that she had already obtained
help drafting the letter from a friend who "got her associate's degree in criminal [sic]."

(IcL)

/
The court considered those discussions to constitute witness tampering and

concluded that it qualified as wrongdoing:
[I]t is fairly clear to the Court listening to those conversations
that there were; there was plenty of influence; there was
plenty of reminders of the past; there were offers of
forgiveness; there were withdrawals of forgiveness; there was
1

One of those calls was transcribed prior to the hearing and, at that time, the transcript
was made part of the record. (R. 217-29) Citations to that transcript are to the original
record copy. The other two calls were not transcribed until the record was supplemented
on appeal. Those calls appear within the transcript of the forfeiture hearing. (R. 272:5059; 61-88.) Citations to those calls are to the hearing transcript at the point where the
call audio was played for the court.
4
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indication after indication that Mr. Zaragoza is changing, that
he's trying to change, that he - frankly, I think he even . . .
made some admissions in the statement that, "you know what
I did" in this case. There was discussion about how he's
going to change. There was the indication of God or a higher
power. There was discussion of the relationship.
(R. 272:103.) Based on that evidence, the trial court concluded Mr. Zaragoza had
engaged in wrongdoing by procuring Mrs. Zaragoza's unavailability at trial and,
therefore, Mr. Zaragoza had forfeited his rights under the Confrontation Clause. (Id.)
The State made the most of that ruling. It presented virtually no direct evidence
about the crime. Its witnesses testified to their recollections about what Mrs. Zaragoza
told them in the hours, days, and weeks following the incident. Only Mr. and Mrs.
Zaragoza's friend, Raelynn Ortiz, testified directly about the events of the evening, and
she testified that she left the room before any assault occurred. (R. 251:122.) Otherwise,
Mrs. Zaragoza's daughter, E.G., testified to her lack of memory, and two police officers
testified about the state of the scene when they arrived. (R. 251:54-61, 62-93, 142-43.)
The remaining evidence was presented, over counsel's objection, in the form of hearsay.
(R. 251:68, 91.)
Because virtually all of the State's evidence regarding the circumstances of the
alleged offenses came in the form of hearsay, it is unsurprising that the evidence was
inconsistent on key points. Most important, the police officer who interviewed Mrs.
Zaragoza in the hours after the incident testified that she told him that Mr. Zaragoza
entered the room at 6:00 a.m. and left the room for several hours once the assault ended.
(R. 251:68-70.) This conflicted with the testimony of another State witness who testified
Mr. Zaragoza challenges the validity of the jury's verdict as well as the evidence on
which it was based. Accordingly, Mr. Zaragoza does not, by setting forth that evidence
herein, concede the truth of any of the State's allegations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that Mrs. Zaragoza told her Mr. Zaragoza entered the room around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. and
remained there until shortly before the police were called. (R. 251:178.)
The State's evidence was rife with other inconsistencies, but that particular
inconsistency was crucial to the relationship between the aggravated kidnapping charge
and the aggravated assault charge. The jury was invited to convict on aggravated
kidnapping, instead of simple kidnapping, based on assault as an aggravating factor.
(R. 252:229.) As discussed below, where an assault is the predicate for a kidnapping, the
distinction between assault and kidnapping hinges on whether the victim was detained for
a substantial period of time longer than the assault itself. Because some of the State's
evidence showed that Mr. Zaragoza left Mrs. Zaragoza alone once the assault ended,
there was a rational basis for the jury to conclude that she was not detained for the
necessary substantial period of time. Based on that finding, the jury had a basis for
convicting only of aggravated assault and for acquitting Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated
kidnapping. Trial counsel requested an instruction to this effect, but the request was
denied. (R. 252:219.)
The jury convicted Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault,
and committing domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R. 198.) Mr. Zaragoza
timely appealed. (R. 238-39.)
II.

Statement of Facts
A.

The Events Preceding the Incident

Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. were staying at a Motel 6 in Salt Lake City with
Ms. Ortiz. (R. 251:109.) On the night of June 16, 2009, Mr. Zaragoza left the room and
went to another nearby hotel. (R. 251:109-12.) Angry at Mr. Zaragoza, Mrs. Zaragoza
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
6
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located him at the nearby hotel, packed up his things, and drove over there to inform him
that she wanted a divorce. (R. 251:176.) After informing Mr. Zaragoza that she planned
on leaving him, she backed over Mr. Zaragoza with the car.3 (R. 251:113.) After waiting
a few moments to see whether Mr. Zaragoza was alright, Mrs. Zaragoza drove the car to
a different nearby hotel where she left the car believing that Mr. Zaragoza would not find
it there. (R. 251:177.) She then returned to the Motel 6. (Id)
From that point forward, the witnesses at trial presented markedly divergent
accounts of what happened. Ms. Ortiz, the only eyewitness who testified on behalf of the
State, testified that she and Mrs. Zaragoza had stayed awake talking for a couple of hours
after they returned to the Motel 6. (R. 251:118-19.) Later that night, police came to the
room in response to the earlier incident at the nearby hotel. (R. 251:119.) Mrs. Zaragoza
had left, but Ms. Ortiz and E.G. were in the room and spoke with police. (Id.) Mrs.
Zaragoza returned to the room and then the two women and E.G. went to sleep.
(R. 251:121.)
Detective Suzanne Williams, a police officer who interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza Mo
weeks after the incident, testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her the following: around 5:00
a.m., Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room; he was upset, so Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. left
the room and went to the front desk of the hotel; Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza continued
arguing at the hotel's front desk, so the clerk at the hotel called the police; Mr. Zaragoza
then left, and Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. returned to the room. (R. 251:177-78.)

One officer testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her that Mr. Zaragoza "came running out
and then . . . ran into the car and then fell down." (R. 251:176.)

7
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Beyond that point, there are essentially as many versions of events as there are
j

witnesses.
B.

The Varying Accounts of the Incident4
1.

Officer Scott Smalley

Officer Smalley responded to a dispatch call at 12:02 p.m. on June 17, 2009. •»
(R. 251:63.) After his backup officer took Mr. Zaragoza into custody, Officer Smalley
and his backup officer searched the hotel room. (R. 251:64, 72.) They gathered evidence
from the scene and Officer Smalley interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza. (R. 251:64-93.)
Recalling this same-day interview, Officer Smalley testified that Mrs. Zaragoza
told him the following: Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room at 6:00 a.m. and, when Ms.
Ortiz answered the door, Mr. Zaragoza entered the room and assaulted Mrs. Zaragoza;
then, "[o]nce he had stopped hitting her" he told her not to call the police and not to think
about running; "[a]fter that he left the room." (R. 251:68-70.)
Officer Smalley then testified that, according to Mrs. Zaragoza, Mr. Zaragoza
returned several hours later, at which point Mrs. Zaragoza elected to call the police.
(R. 251:70.) After learning that she had called the police, Mr. Zaragoza ordered Mrs.
Zaragoza to take a shower while he began cleaning the room. (R. 251:70-71.) Then,
according to Officer Smalley's recollection of Mrs. Zaragoza's version of events, Mrs.
Zaragoza left the room. (R. 251:70.)

4

A separate officer, David Malley, testified he responded to the scene along with Officer
Smalley. Since Officer Malley apparently did not have the privilege of hearing any
eyewitness's version of events, his testimony at trial was limited (as the State's other
witnesses' testimony should have been) to the circumstances surrounding the dispatch
call, his limited observation of the scene when he arrived, and his observations about Mr.
Zaragoza's demeanor when the officers detained him. (R. 251:54-61.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

Ms. Ortiz

Ms. Ortiz testified about her direct experience. After speaking with police officers
about the incident at the other hotel, Ms. Ortiz went back to sleep. (R. 251:119-21.) She
awoke later when Mr. Zaragoza knocked on the door. (R. 251:121.) He entered the room
and she left. (R. 251:122.) She was not present for anything that happened in the room
during the incident. (R. 251:122, 130.) She returned a couple of hours later with a friend
of hers, but they found no one in the room. (R. 251:122-24.) Ms. Ortiz and the friend
cleaned up the room. (R. 251:123.)
3.

JE.Cr.

The State called E.G., but she offered no detail about the events surrounding the
incident. She recalled being at the Motel 6, but stated that she remembered only that her
mom and dad were "in the restroom and [Mr. Zaragoza] told [Mrs. Zaragoza] to wait here
in the motel and he left and then after that he was gone." (R. 251:142.) After that, her
mother told her to look outside and, when nobody was there, they left and went to the
office. (Id)
Because E.G. testified to a lack of memory and denied making statements to
police officers, the State was permitted to introduce her out-of-court statements.
(R. 251:147, 155-63.)
4.

Detective Wendy Willis

Detective Willis interviewed E.G. in the week after the incident at the Motel 6.
Detective Willis testified that E.G. told her the following: when Mr. Zaragoza returned to
the room on the morning of June 17, Ms. Ortiz answered the door; Mr. Zaragoza entered
the room and began arguing with Mrs. Zaragoza; Mr. Zaragoza then assaulted Mrs.
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Zaragoza and, later, forced her to shower; while she was showering, Ms. Ortiz and Mr.
Zaragoza cleaned up the room with the help of Ms. Ortiz's friend; Ms. Ortiz and her
friend then left the room to retrieve the car while Mr. Zaragoza remained behind; Ms.
Ortiz returned alone with the car and she amd Mr. Zaragoza left together; at that point,
Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. went to the hotel lobby to call the police. (R. 251:159-63.)
5.

Detective Suzanne Williams

Detective Williams interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza two weeks after the incident at the
Motel 6. (R. 251:173.) Detective Williams testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told her the
following: after the 5:00 a.m. incident, Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. returned to the room and
went to sleep; Mr. Zaragoza returned to the room around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. and began
assaulting Mrs. Zaragoza; during the assault, which lasted for two to three hours, Ms.
Ortiz and E.G. were "hiding in a corner;" Mrs. Zaragoza took a shower, during which
time Mr. Zaragoza, Ms. Ortiz, and Ms. Ortiz's friend were in the room cleaning up; Mr.
Zaragoza then sent Ms. Ortiz's friend to retrieve the car; after sending Ms. Ortiz's friend
to retrieve the car, Mr. Zaragoza left, at which time Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. left the room
and called the police. (R. 251:177-85.)
6.

Christine Zaragoza

Mrs. Zaragoza testified after, and only because, her hearsay statements already had
been introduced. She testified that Mr. Zaragoza never locked her in the room, never
threatened her with harm if she left, and never physically restrained her. (R. 251:197-98.)
She also testified that she had lied to police officers in the past and had fabricated
allegations against Mr. Zaragoza. (R. 251:198.) For example, when Mr. Zaragoza had
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possession of their car she lied to police because she "wanted the car back and [she] was
going to do anything and say whatever to get it back." (Id.)
C.

Key Evidentiary Discrepancies

A review of the varying accounts of the incident reveals key evidentiary
discrepancies. First, Ms. Ortiz denied being in the room during the incident and testified
that when she later returned and began cleaning the room with her friend, no one was
there. (R. 251:123-24, 130.) But Officers Williams and Willis claimed that they were
told that Ms. Ortiz was in the room the entire time (recall Officer Williams' vivid account
of Ms. Ortiz and E.G. "hiding in a corner") and that Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Zaragoza cleaned
the room together while Mrs. Zaragoza was showering. (R. 251:159, 162, 180, 182-83.)
Officer Williams testified that Ms. Ortiz's friend left to retrieve the car and that Mr.
Zaragoza left shortly thereafter, while Officer Willis testified that Ms. Ortiz and her
friend both went to retrieve the car while Mr. Zaragoza waited. (R. 251:162, 183.) Then,
when Ms. Ortiz returned with the car, Mr. Zaragoza left with Ms. Ortiz. Both of these
versions of events conflict with Ms. Ortiz's direct testimony, which was that Mr.
Zaragoza was gone when she returned to the room. (R. 251:123-24.)
All of these versions of events also conflict with the testimony of Officer Smalley.
Officer Smalley testified that Mrs. Zaragoza told him the assault began around 6:00 a.m.
and that, "once [Mr. Zaragoza] stopped hitting her," he left the room for several hours.
(R. 251:68-70.) According to Officer Smalley, Mrs. Zaragoza said that it was after Mr.
Zaragoza returned that she decided she should call the police, that she then "was able to
call the police," and that Mr. Zaragoza then told her to take a shower while he cleaned the
room. (R. 251:70-71.) Then, according to Officer Smalley, when Mrs. Zaragoza got out

11
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of the shower, she left. (R. 251:70.) This is consistent with Mrs. Zaragoza's direct
testimony that she was never threatened with harm if she tried to leave. (R. 251:198.)
And it is in direct conflict with the testimony of Officers Williams and Willis, who
recounted markedly different stories Mrs. Zaragoza told them in the weeks after the
incident about what happened that night.
Summary of the Argument
Mr. Zaragoza is entitled to a new trial on two grounds. First, the trial court
should have given a requested jury instruction explaining that aggravated assault, in the
circumstances of this case, is a lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnapping.
Second, the trial court violated Mr. Zaragoza's rights under the Confrontation Clause by
allowing the State to introduce Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements at trial.
First, the State's case consisted almost entirely of hearsay statements that,
unsurprisingly, differed in material respects from witness to witness. Among other
things, the officers' testimony varied about a critically important issue: what happened
after the assault ended? Although the jury heard testimony that tended to show Mr.
Zaragoza threatened Mrs. Zaragoza in order to detain her, that testimony was
contradicted not only by Mrs. Zaragoza herself, but also by Officer Smalley, who
testified that Mr. Zaragoza left once the assault ended. Given those inconsistencies, there
was a rational basis for jurors to doubt the detention element of the kidnapping charge:
under Officer Smalley's version of events, the detention did not persist for a substantial
period of time longer than the assault. Trial counsel requested a jury instruction that
would inform the jurors of the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and the
lesser-included charge of aggravated assetult, but the trial court refused to give the
12
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requested jury instruction. This Court should order a new trial.
In addition to being inconsistent regarding the duration of the incident, the State's
evidence was inconsistent in other respects. The State's witnesses could not agree on
when the incident occurred, who was in the room while it was happening, or what
happened after it ended.
These inconsistencies are a symptom of the trial court's second error—letting the
police testify about Mrs. Zaragoza's out-of-court statements at all. Mrs. Zaragoza elected
not to testify against her husband. Under the Utah Constitution, she had the privilege not
to do so. Because she invoked that privilege, she was unavailable to testify at trial.
Given Mr. Zaragoza's rights under the Confrontation Clause, her unavailability should
have precluded the introduction of her out-of-court statements.
The trial court concluded otherwise. Its conclusion was based on its application of
Utah's forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, under which a defendant forfeits his rights
under the Confrontation Clause if a witness is unavailable as a result of the defendant's
intentional wrongdoing. This doctrine was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
approximately 5 weeks before the trial court applied it in this case. State v. Poole, 2010
UT 25, f 20, 232 P.3d 519 (issued April 30, 2010). Notably, the Utah Supreme Court did
not apply the test it adopted in Poole, so the trial court was faced with an issue of first
impression in Utah.
In breaking new legal ground, the trial court fundamentally misconstrued the
wrongdoing element of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. The trial court heard a
small number of phone calls between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza while Mr. Zaragoza was
incarcerated pending trial on these charges. Based on the substance of the calls—which
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
13 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

the court found contained influence, reminders of the past, and indications that Mr.
Zaragoza would change—the trial court concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his
constitutional rights. Notably, Mr. Zaragoza did not threaten Mrs. Zaragoza during these
calls. Nor did he prompt her to lie on his behalf. The trial court's construction of the
element of wrongdoing is unprecedented and impermissibly expansive, especially
because it disregards the constitutional status of Mrs. Zaragoza's spousal privilege.
Had the trial court not erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights
under the Confrontation Clause, the hearsay statements of Mrs. Zaragoza would not have
been admitted over Mr. Zaragoza's objections, Mrs. Zaragoza never would have testified,
and the evidentiary picture at trial would have been materially different. None of the
State's witnesses could have testified substantively about the circumstances of the
assault, and it is reasonably likely that Mr. Zaragoza would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at trial. Thus, the trial court's violation of Mr. Zaragoza's
constitutional rights also constituted harmful error. This Court should order a new trial
on this independent ground.
i

Argument

Mr. Zaragoza is entitled to a new trial for two independent reasons. First, given
the evidence adduced at trial, Mr. Zaragoza was entitled to a jury instruction explaining
the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and the lesser-included offense of
aggravated assault. Second, Mr. Zaragoza's conviction rests almost entirely on hearsay
evidence that never should have been admitted because the trial court erroneously
concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights. Those issues will
be discussed in turn.

\
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I.

The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give Mr. Zaragoza's Requested Jury
Instruction Explaining the Lesser-Included Relationship Between Aggravated
Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault
The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that aggravated assault is a lesser-

included offense of aggravated kidnapping is reversible error. As a matter of federal and
state due process, when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser-included offense,
the "instruction [must] be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction." State
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156-57 (Utah 1983) (quoting Hopper v. Evans. 456 U.S 605, 611
(1982)). In Utah, Utah Code section 76-1-402(4) gives effect to this guarantee by
requiring a trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included relationship of two
offenses when "there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense."
To determine whether the evidence warrants a lesser-included offense instruction
in a particular case, a trial court must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, the trial court
must determine whether "there exist[s] some overlap in the statutory elements" of the
related offenses. Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59; see also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424
(Utah 1986) ("[T]he test is whether the elements overlap at all." (emphasis added)). It is
settled law in Utah that this requirement is satisfied as to the elements of aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984)
(per curiam). Here, because the assault in this case was a possible factor for transforming
kidnapping into aggravated kidnapping, there is not merely "some overlap" in the
elements of the two crimes—there is almost complete overlap.
Second, the trial court must determine whether the jury was "presented with a
sufficient quantum of evidence . . . to justify sending the question to the jury." Baker,
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671 P.2d at 159. This threshold requirement is satisfied when "the evidence is
ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations." Id. Put differently, a
"jury question exists and the court must give a lesser-included offense instruction" when
"one alternative [interpretation] would permit acquittal of the greater offense" and
conviction of the lesser. Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, the judge cannot assess
witness credibility in making this determination. Id. And because of the interest in
sending such issues to the jury, when a court evaluates whether an adequate quantum of
evidence was presented at trial, the court must view the facts and all inferences in the
light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, J 10, 152 P.3d 315.
Important concerns underlie those standards. On the one hand, this rule protects
society's "'legitimate interest in the jury's freedom to act according to the evidence'" by
"permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than
forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal."
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting People v. Chamblis, 236 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Mich.
1975)). On the other hand, it protects the defendant from juror over-reaching: "[w]here
one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction."
Baker, 671 P.2d at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant desires to
present the jury with a "iess drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the
offense charged and acquittal,'" the defendant's proposal must be implemented to "give
the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard." Id. at 156-57 (quoting Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980)).

16
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Before explaining the evidentiary basis for submitting Mr. Zaragoza's proposed
instruction to the jury, it is important to note precisely what Mr. Zaragoza is arguing.5
Double jeopardy concerns arise when a charge of kidnapping arises from an offense, like
assault, that necessarily requires a victim to be detained against his will. State v. Lee,
2006 UT 5, ^ 25-35, 128 P.3d 1179. To ensure the defendant is not punished twice for
the same conduct, the detention must be substantially "longer than the necessary
detention involved in the commission" of the assault. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
Tf 19, 994 P.2d 1243. A detention that is "merely incidental" to the underlying assault
cannot satisfy the detention element of kidnapping, or else virtually every assault would
be transformed into a kidnapping. Id.; Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^f 27. The detention also must
"'have some significance independent of the [assault].'" Lee, 2006 UT 5, % 27 (quoting
Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, If 23).
For the jury to convict Mr. Zaragoza of both kidnapping and assault, it was
required to find that Mrs. Zaragoza was detained substantially longer than necessary to
commit the assault and that the additional detention had significance independent of the

5

Mr. Zaragoza pauses here to clarify this argument because trial counsel presented the
argument in two ways. First, trial counsel argued that the kidnapping charge merged into
the assault charge. (R. 252:217-18). To find that the offenses merged, the trial court
would have been required to find, as a matter of law, that the assault could not have been
committed without Mr. Zaragoza also having committed the kidnapping. State v. Bisner,
2001 UT 99, If 63, 37 P.3d 1073. The trial court rejected the merger argument on the
basis that "there is no detention that is necessarily incidental to the crime of aggravated
assault." (R. 252:218.) Trial counsel then argued, given the court's ruling on merger,
that the issue should be sent to the jury. (R. 252:219.) The court refused to grant this
instruction. It is from this second decision—the refusal to grant the instruction—that Mr.
Zaragoza appeals.
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assault. Consistent with those principles, Mr. Zaragoza requested the following jury
instruction on the relationship between aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault:
You are instructed that the law does not allow double
punishment for the same act. Accordingly, you may not find
the defendant guilty of both a kidnapping charge and an
assault charge unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
any detention of Ms. Zaragoza was independent of and not
merely incidental to any assault of Ms. Zaragoza.
Accordingly, if you find that Mr. Zaragoza assaulted Ms.
Zaragoza over a period of time, but that he did not detain or
restrain her for any significant period of time, in addition to
the time taken up by the assault, you may not find him guilty
of kidnapping.
(R. 252:219.) That instruction concerning the distinction between aggravated assault and
aggravated kidnapping would have explained to the jurors a legitimate basis for
acquitting Mr. Zaragoza of the kidnapping charge and of convicting him of the
aggravated assault charge.
Further, there was a sufficient quantum of evidence to justify sending this issue to
the jury. Mrs. Zaragoza testified that, during the incident, she was never physically
restrained, never threatened with harm if she left the motel room, and never locked in the
room. (R. 251:197-98.) Officer Smalley's testimony supports this version of events. He
testified that "[o]nce [Mr. Zaragoza] stopped hitting her" he told Mrs. Zaragoza not to
call the police and not to run. (R. 251:70.) Then, "[a]fter that he left the room [and]
came back several hours later." (Id.) Finally, Officer Smalley testified that, when Mr.
Zaragoza returned, Mrs. Zaragoza decided to call the police and that she was able to do
so. From that evidence, the jury could have concluded that an assault happened early in
the day and that Mr. Zaragoza left Mrs. Zaragoza after the conclusion of the assault.

18
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Had the jury accepted that testimony, it also rationally could have concluded that
there was no detention or restraint beyond the restraint that was incidental to the assault.
This provided a rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Zaragoza of the kidnapping
charge while convicting him only of the assault charge.6 Under those circumstances, Mr.
Zaragoza was entitled to present this question to the jury. The trial court's refusal to
grant Mr. Zaragoza's lesser-included offense instruction requires a new trial.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Mrs. Zaragoza's Out-of-Court
Statements Under the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Doctrine Because Mr.
Zaragoza's Actions Did Not Constitute Wrongdoing
Mr. Zaragoza's discussions with his wife do not constitute wrongdoing such that

Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights. The Confrontation Clauses of
both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution provide defendants in
criminal trials with the right to be confronted by the witnesses against them. Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Poole, 2010 UT 25,110. Those provisions bar the
introduction of out-of-court testimonial statements where the defendant has not had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the
Confrontation Clause that applies when a defendant procures a witness's unavailability
through wrongdoing. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Under that exception, a defendant
forfeits his rights under the Confrontation Clause if "(1) the witness is unavailable at trial,
6

Or to convict him of the kidnapping charge rather than the assault charge. Further, the
charge of domestic violence in the presence of a child is derivative of the assault charge,
not the kidnapping charge. (R. 36.) Thus, a verdict convicting Mr. Zaragoza of
kidnapping alone would preclude a guilty verdict on the domestic violence charge. Since
the error injury instructions impacts the validity of all three verdicts, Mr. Zaragoza is
entitled to a new trial as to all three counts.
7
U.S. Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12.
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(2) the witness's unavailability was caused by a wrongful act of the defendant, and (3) the
defendant's act was done with an intent to make the witness unavailable." Poole, 2010
UT 25, Tf 20. As discussed below, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza's
conduct in this case constituted a '"wrongful act" within the meaning of this test.
At the outset, it is important to note the unsettled and unique status of Utah law on
this issue. The law is unsettled because no Utah court has ever applied the Utah standard
for forfeiture. In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the forfeiture doctrine but,
because the court found that the witness in that case was not unavailable, it had no
occasion to consider whether the defendant's conduct in that case constituted
wrongdoing. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 34. Poole was issued five weeks prior to the trial
court's forfeiture hearing in this case. Counsel has been unable to find any reported case,
from the date Poole was issued until now, interpreting the Utah rule.
This vacuum of local authority is important for two reasons. First, the United
States Supreme Court has expressly left to the states the task of applying the forfeiture
doctrine. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 21 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833
(2006)). Utah is therefore free to craft a local rule so long as it provides at least the same
level of constitutional protection required under the United States Constitution. Second,
crafting a rule unique to Utah is especially important because the spousal testimonial
privilege is constitutionally based in Utah. Utah appears to be unique among states and
the federal government in that regard. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-45
(1980) (privilege in federal courts arises under federal common law). Accordingly, in
determining what standard of conduct can legitimately be deemed wrongful for purposes
of the forfeiture analysis, Utah courts must not only balance the integrity of the criminal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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system and the defendants' constitutional confrontation rights, but also must strike that
balance in a way that gives effect to the constitutional status of the spousal testimonial
privilege. The trial court's conclusion here that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his confrontation
rights failed to strike this balance.
This erroneous conclusion requires a new trial. As demonstrated below: (i) the
trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza engaged in Wrongdoing" within the
meaning of the relevant test; and (ii) given that virtually all of the State's evidence at trial
came from these inadmissible statements, that error was prejudicial.
A.

Mr. Zaragoza Did Not Engage in Wrongdoing

Mr. Zaragoza's conduct in this case is not of the kind that justifies forfeiture of his
rights under the Confrontation Clause. The quintessential example of wrongdoing that
justifies forfeiture is murdering a witness to prevent that witness from testifying. The
cases on that point are legion. Not surprisingly, the forfeiture doctrine has also been
found to reach conduct such as threats and attempted violence that dissuade a witness
from testifying. Under what are apparently the most expansive applications, the
8

See, e.g.. Ponce v. Felker. 606 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (murdering witness);
United States v. Vallee. 304 F. Appx. 916, 920-21 (2d Cir. 2008) (murdering witness);
Hodges v. Attorney General. 506 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (murdering witness);
United States v. Johnson. 495 F.3d 951, 971 (8th Cir. 2007) (aiding and abetting murder
of witness); United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (attempting to
murder, and then, while incarcerated, orchestrating the successful murder of witness);
United States v. Martinez. 476 F.3d 961, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (murdering witness);
United States v. Ervin. 209 F. Appx. 519, 520-22 (6th Cir. 2006) (carjacking and
kidnapping witness, which ultimately led to witness being killed in confrontation with
police); United States v. Grav. 405 F.3d 227, 241-43 (4th Cir. 2005) (murdering witness);
United States v. Severo Garcia-Meza. 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (murdering
witness)
9
See Drummond v. Cunningham. No. 08-cv-4290,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139885, at
* 29 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,2010) (threats and witness intimidation); United States v.
Basciano. 430 F. Supp. 2d 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (threats); Oge v. Greiner, No. 02-cvDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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forfeiture doctrine has also been applied in cases where the defendant has concealed
witnesses from law enforcement or has otherwise interfered with judicial
administration.10
The trial court's decision in this case would apply the forfeiture doctrine more
broadly—deeming constitutional rights forfeited on a lesser showing—than even the
most expansive applications of that doctrine in other jurisdictions. Mr. Zaragoza will
address two issues relevant to the finding of wrongdoing: (1) the trial court's application
of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
treatment of that issue and is unique in its sweeping breadth and (2) the interplay of
Confrontation Clause rights and the spousal privilege under the Utah constitution requires
more, not less, protection for defendants like Mr. Zaragoza.
1.

The Trial Court's Conception of Wrongdoing Is Impermissibly
Broad

The trial court adopted an excessively broad standard for determining what

1199, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22578, at * 13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2003) (threats), Skinner
v. Duncan, No. 01 Civ. 6656, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10102, at *112 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
2003) (threats); Geraci v. Senkowski. 23 F.Supp. 2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (threats); State
v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 1987) (no forfeiture where threats took place during
commission of crime); People v. Hampton, No. 1-03-0067, 2005 111. App. LEXIS 1188,
at * 16-17 (persuading witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege where privilege did
not apply).
10
See Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145, 158-60 (1878) (evidence that defendant
concealed the whereabouts of witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena); Steele v.
Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1982) (codefendant was a pimp and witness
was his prostitute; before trial, codefendant hired attorney for prostitute witness who
counseled her to rely on spousal privilege despite trial court finding that pimp and
prostitute were not common law spouses; court of appeals concluded that all
codefendants participated in a combination of tactics that ended in prostitute-witness
being held in contempt of court rather than testifying); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d
637, 650 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense attorney attempting to compel witness on the stand to
assert Fifth Amendment privilege).
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constitutes wrongdoing. The trial court's standard is flawed for three reasons. First, it
fails to give effect to the "wrongdoing" element in the Utah Supreme Court's articulation
of the forfeiture standard. Second, it deems privileged conduct wrongful. Third, it
reaches more broadly than even the most expansive applications of the forfeiture doctrine
in other jurisdictions.
First, the trial court's application of the rule is incompatible with the Utah
Supreme Court's articulation of the standard for forfeiture by wrongdoing. As discussed,
in Poole the Utah Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining whether
Confrontation Clause rights have been forfeited. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 20. One of the
elements of this test is that the witness's unavailability must be caused by a "wrongful act
of the defendant." Id. f 20. But here, the trial court essentially concluded that any act
undertaken with the intent to procure a witness's unavailability is per se wrongful. That
view would collapse the wrongfulness element of the forfeiture standard into the
unavailability element and would not give effect to the rule announced in Poole. That is,
the Utah Supreme Court did not announce a forfeiture doctrine based merely on intended
unavailability; instead, the rule that it announced requires a showing of a "wrongful act."
Id. As discussed below, that distinction is significant because, in Poole, the court was
aware of case law from Massachusetts adopting the intended unavailability' standard,
but the court instead concluded that the federal constitution requires a showing of
wrongfulness. See idL f 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830N.E.2d 158, 170
(Mass. 2005).
Second, the trial court's articulation of the rule makes no room for privileged
conduct. The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the spousal privilege in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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analogous context of witness tampering provides a useful analogy. In Arthur Andersen
LLP v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal witness tampering statute
that prohibits "corruptly persuad[ing]" a witness to withhold testimony. Arthur Andersen
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. $
1512(b)(2)(A) to (B)). Given the federal common law spousal privilege, the court
indicated that persuading a spouse to withhold testimony would not constitute witness
tampering. Otherwise, the court reasoned, the word "corruptly" in the statute would not
be given the intended effect. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied this
reasoning to overturn a witness tampering conviction based on a husband's seeking to
have his wife exercise her marital privilege. United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181 (9th
Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Farrell, 126F.3d484,488 (3dCir. 1997) ("[W]e are
. . . confident that the 'culpable conduct' that violates § 1512(b)(3)'s 'corruptly
persuades' clause does not include a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator
who enjoys a Fifth Amendment right" to exercise the Fifth Amendment privilege.). The
conversations between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza should not be considered wrongful for the
same reason that the United States Supreme Court indicated they are not "corrupt."
Third, the trial court's application of the forfeiture standard in this case is overly
expansive, exceeding the breadth of the doctrine even in some of its most expansive
applications. On this point, three cases are instructive. The first is Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 171 (Mass. 2005), where the Massachusetts Supreme Court
adopted the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. In that case, the court was called upon to
decide whether "collusion" between a witness and defendant constituted wrongdoing. Id.
at 168-69. The court noted that "no court has expressly applied the doctrine to
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'collusion/'

so the court undertook to survey several of the more expansive

applications of the forfeiture doctrine. Id. at 169-71. The court concluded that colluding
with a witness to devise a way to keep the witness from testifying constitutes wrongdoing
in and of itself sufficient to support a finding a forfeiture.

Id. at 171 -72.

Edwards is instructive primarily because of its contrast with Mr. Zaragoza's case.
In Edwards, there was evidence that the incarcerated defendant conspired with the
witness to prevent him from testifying. Id. at 174-75. Although the witness testified
before the grand jury on multiple instances, the witness subsequently elected, at the time
of the defendant's trial, to serve a sentence for contempt of court rather than testify. Id. at
163. Notably, especially given the finding of contempt, there is no indication in Edwards
that the collusion that supported a finding of wrongdoing implicated any privilege.13
Given that Edwards was decided relatively recently, this statement suggests that
Edwards, and the cases cited therein, represent some of the most expansive applications
of the doctrine to date. Since Edwards, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has addressed
the spousal privilege in a case where the defendant married the witness for the purpose of
endowing her with the ability to invoke the spousal privilege. Commonwealth v.
Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Mass. 2010). Szerlong is inapposite to the case at hand,
as Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza were married prior to the events giving rise to this case.
12
A close reading of the cases relied on in Edwards, shows that each of them is
distinguishable from the facts of this case. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-60 (evidence that
defendant concealed the whereabouts of witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena);
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (murder); United States v.
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815-16 (10th Cir. 2000) (conspiracy to murder); United States v.
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (murder); Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198-99
(codefendants conspiring to have witness wrongfully invoke invalid spousal privilege);
State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356-58 (Iowa 2000) (defendant pressured witness to
exercise Fifth Amendment privilege despite grant of immunity to witness and despite
witness's admitted desire, at times, to testify); People v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001,
1004-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (defendant hired witness's attorney and referred her to a
psychiatrist who assisted defense by documenting witness's claim of amnesia to support
her claim of lack of memory at trial).
The witness did not participate in the alleged criminal conduct. He was in the
company of the defendant in the hours after the crime, and his testimony would have
shown only what he observed and discussed with the defendant after the crime.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

Indeed, in discussing the notion of collusion, the Edwards court expressly disclaimed the
proposition that "informing a witness of the right to remain silent, guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States constitution will be sufficient to constitute forfeiture."
Id. at 171. Thus, even in what is apparently one of the most expansive applications of the
forfeiture doctrine, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the approach taken by the
trial court in this case. Further, because the spousal privilege at issue in this case
implicated the rights of both the defendant and the witness, as discussed below,
conversations regarding the spousal privilege deserve even greater deference than
conversations about a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege.
Edwards is instructive for another reason. Throughout its discussion in Poole, the
Utah Supreme Court relied on Edwards for a handful of propositions—that the forfeiture
doctrine has been universally adopted, that the wrongdoing must be undertaken with the
specific intent to prevent the witness from testifying, and that a preponderance-of-theevidence standard applies to the court's determinations regarding forfeiture. Poole, 2010
UT 25,fflf15, 18, 22. But Poole did not follow Edwards in determining the standard for
forfeiture by wrongdoing. That is, the Edwards rule permits forfeiture on a mere showing
that "the defendant was involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the
witness." Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 170. But the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the
federal constitution permits "the protections of the confrontation clause [to] cease to
apply to a defendant who 'causes a potential witness's unavailability by a wrongful act.'"
Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 10 (quoting United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir.
1996)) (emphasis added) (internal number omitted). That suggests not only that the Utah
Supreme Court deliberately rejected the expansive forfeiture doctrine announced in
26
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Edwards, but also that it did so based on its understanding that the United States
Constitution does not permit such ready forfeiture of confrontation rights.
The second instructive case is United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 650 (6th Cir.
1975). Mayes and the cases relying on it are often cited for the proposition that a
defendant's mere "chicanery" in preventing a witness from testifying can constitute
wrongdoing.14 The conduct that supported a finding of wrongdoing based on chicanery
in Mayes is far afield from Mr. Zaragoza's conduct in the case at hand.15 In Mayes, when
a witness would take the stand at trial, defense counsel frustrated the prosecution's
attempts to elicit the witness's testimony by attempting to assert, for his client's benefit, a
14

United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d. Cir. 1997) (witness murdered), United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d. Cir. 1982) (witness murdered); La
Torres v. Walker, 216 F.Supp. 2d 157, 166 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (murder); State v. Romero,
133 P.3d 842, 864 (N.M. 2006) (witness murdered); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d 699,
703 (N.M. 2004) (no wrongdoing where defendant fled the jurisdiction for several years,
during which time witness was deported); State v. Ivy, No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD,
2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1154, at *35 (Term. Crim. App., Dec. 30, 2004) (witness
murdered), Commonwealth v. Salaam, No. CR03-4625, 2004 VA. Cir. LEXIS 289, at
**17-18 (Va. Cir. Ct, Aug. 25, 2004) (witness murdered); State v. Henry, 820 A.2d
1076, 1086 (Conn. App. 2003) (witness murdered); Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983) (witness murdered); see also cases cited supra note 9. Most of these
cases cite Mastrangelo. But Mastrangelo considered forfeiture in the context of a
murdered witness. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73. Its use of the word "chicanery" is
based on its direct reliance on Mayes. Id.
15
The Eighth Circuit apparently came to the "chicanery" standard by a different route,
relying on the Supreme Court decisions in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912),
and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). But these decisions are even less applicable to the case
at hand than the Second Circuit's decision in Mayes. Reynolds included evidence that
the defendant concealed the whereabouts of a witness to assist her in avoiding subpoena.
98 U.S. at 158-60. Here, Mrs. Zaragoza presented herself to the court in invoking her
spousal privilege. Diaz, involved a defendant who stipulated to the introduction of outof-court statements believing that some were favorable to him. 223 U.S. at 456-58. The
court held that he could not, on appeal, challenge the verdict against him on confrontation
clause grounds because he waived his confrontation rights in stipulating to the
introduction of the statements. Id Neither of these cases involved conduct of the sort
that led to the trial court's forfeiture decision in this case.
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Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the testifying, non-client, witness. Id. at 650.
The court of appeals noted that "nowhere [did] it appear that [the witness] himself sought
personally to invoke the privilege, or even wanted to." Id. Indeed, the court found that,
"[o]n the contrary, when allowed the opportunity to answer questions . . . [the witness]
acknowledged that he had earlier told the government agents that he did not want an
attorney, that he wanted to answer questions, and that when he arrived at the courthouse
that morning . . . he had fully expected to testify for the prosecution." Id
This stands in contrast to the conduct of Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza. Here, Mrs.
Zaragoza sought independent counsel who contacted the court on her behalf and arranged
for her to be able to assert her privilege. There was no finding below that Mr. Zaragoza
coerced this action, or that the choice was anything other than voluntary on Mrs.
Zaragoza's part. The conduct at issue in this case is not the kind of chicanery that, absent
threats, coercion, or actual violence, supports a finding of wrongdoing.
The final instructive case is United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir.
2005), which the State relied on heavily in arguing the forfeiture issue to the trial court.
Admittedly, given the breadth of conduct that it prohibits and the sweep with which it
applies, Montague may represent the high-water mark with regard to what can be
considered wrongdoing. Although Montague bears a number of factual similarities to
this case, it is distinguishable in critical respects. As in this case, the witness in
Montague was the defendant's wife, and the finding of forfeiture was based on conduct
between the witness and her husband while he was incarcerated and the witness's
decision to invoke her spousal privilege. Montague, 421 F.3d at 1101. Unlike this case,
however, the witness testified that her husband had attempted to persuade her to lie on his
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

behalf. Id. And at a grand jury proceeding the witness expressed her desire not to lie for
her husband, but then reversed course by invoking her privilege at trial. Id. Further, the
witness's children provided evidence that the witness was afraid of her husband. Id.
Contrast those facts with the facts here. The trial court's decision here was not
based on evidence that Mrs. Zaragoza was acting out of fear of her husband. Nor was the
trial court presented with any evidence that Mr. Zaragoza pressured Mrs. Zaragoza to lie
on his behalf. And the events leading up to trial corroborate the conclusion that the
desire not to testify was shared equally between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza—Mrs. Zaragoza
did not appear at some proceedings expressing a desire to testify and then change her
mind after contact with her husband. Rather, throughout the proceedings below, she
consistently represented her unwillingness to testify. (R. 44-52, 272:2-3.) Further, as
discussed in detail in the next section, the constitutional nature of the spousal privilege in
Utah requires a greater showing of wrongdoing here than was required in Montague.
In short, the trial court's broad application of the forfeiture doctrine, if not wholly
unprecedented, is certainly broader than the doctrine in the vast majority of cases. Where
most decisions applying the forfeiture doctrine arise when a witness is absent due to
threats, violence, or murder, Mr. Zaragoza was deemed to have forfeited his
Confrontation Clause rights when Mrs. Zaragoza invoked her spousal privilege. As the
court in Edwards indicated, this is not the kind of collusion that supports a finding of
wrongdoing. Even measured against some of the least favorable standards for forfeiture,
the trial court's conclusion to the contrary was in error. Worse, all of the foregoing
cases—regardless of how broadly they apply the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine—are
an inadequate measuring stick in Utah. Mr. Zaragoza has been unable to find any case
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where a constitutionally protected spousal privilege formed the basis for the findings of
unavailability and wrongdoing. That is not surprising because Utah is unique in its
constitutionalization of the spousal privilege. As a result, the standard for wrongdoing in
this case must be equally unique.
2.

The Constitutional Status of the Spousal Privilege in Utah
Requires a Different Standard for Wrongdoing in This Case

Permitting conversations about the spousal testimonial privilege to constitute
wrongdoing unconstitutionally expands the concept of wrongdoing. Under article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, "a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife." This spousal testimonial privilege prohibits
one spouse from being forced to give involuntary, in-court testimony against the other
spouse. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58. f 2L 218 P.3d 590. Importantly, "the
purpose of the spousal testimonial privilege is to foster 'the harmony and sanctity of the
marriage relationship.'" IcL (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980)).
There are two facets to this purpose, though the trial court acknowledged only one.
Relying on a case from Washington, State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Wash.
1992), the court concluded that one facet of the privilege is to save the testifying spouse
from the repulsive task of testifying against her husband in open court or choosing
between contempt and perjury. Given this consideration, the court found the privilege
would not be violated here because Mrs. Zaragoza would not be forced to take the stand.
This conclusion, as far as it goes, is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's articulation
of the scope of the privilege in Timmerman, which held that the spousal privilege is not
violated where the invoking spouse is not compelled to testify at trial. Id. Tf 21.
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But a second facet of the privilege is inherent in its nature and necessary to its
stated purpose. That is, if the purpose of the "privilege is to foster the harmony and
sanctity of the marriage relationship," both spouses must hold a constitutionally protected
right to discuss the impact that the trial, the criminal charges, and the decision to invoke
the privilege will have on their marriage. It is one thing to say that the accused spouse
cannot substitute his will for that of the testifying spouse, but it is quite another to
conclude that the accused spouse forfeits his rights under the Confrontation Clause if he
discusses the ramifications of the spousal privilege with the testifying spouse. Deeming
the conduct in this case to constitute forfeiture will lower the bar for wrongdoing such
that accused spouses will lose the ability to discuss the marital privilege—and the
privilege's role in the harmony and sanctity of the marital relationship—for fear that the
spousal privilege and forfeiture of confrontation rights will go hand in hand. This Court
should reject a conception of wrongdoing that diminishes one constitutional right (the
spousal privilege) as a means of finding that another such right (the confrontation right)
has been forfeited altogether.
In addition, because of the constitutional nature of confrontation rights and the
spousal privilege, a statutory definition of witness tampering cannot be coextensive with
a constitutional standard for wrongdoing. As an analytical matter, the scope of the
spousal privilege and the wrongdoing required under the forfeiture analysis cannot be
coextensive with a statutory requirement. If all criminal acts constituted wrongdoing per
se under the forfeiture analysis, the legislature could curtail Confrontation Clause rights
by criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be sufficient to give rise to forfeiture.
General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956) (Where an
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antimonopoly provision was part of the Utah Constitution, "mere legislative enactment
would not carve out any exception to it [because that] would have to be done by
constitutional amendment."). The spousal privilege, similarly, may not be modified by
legislative action. Utah R. Evid. 502 adv. comm. note (noting that to fully modify the
scope of the spousal privilege, part of article I, section 12 would need to be repealed).
Because of the constitutional status of both the spousal privilege and confrontation rights,
whether Mr. Zaragoza's conduct met the elements of a particular criminal statute cannot
be determinative of whether his conduct constitutes wrongdoing or of whether it is
protected by the spousal privilege.
In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the standard for forfeiture by
wrongdoing that it believed "strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the
integrity of the criminal process and dissuading defendants from tampering with
witnesses, and the right [to cross-examination] guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution." 2010 UT 25, f 20. Here, although the invocation of the spousal
privilege has the consequence of keeping evidence from the trier of fact, that
consideration could not have escaped the drafters of the Utah Constitution when they
elevated the spousal privilege, like confrontation rights, to constitutional status. The
balance here must be struck differently. The trial court's interpretation of wrongdoing
failed to account for the unique constitutional importance of the spousal privilege.
In short, the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Zaragoza's contact with his wife
constituted wrongdoing under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. As a result, the
court permitted the out-of-court testimonial statements of Mrs. Zaragoza to be introduced
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into evidence in violation of Mr. Zaragoza's Confrontation Clause rights. As will be
discussed in the next portion of this section, that error was far from harmless.
B.

The Admission of Mrs. Zaragoza's Statements Constitutes Harmful
Error

The trial court's decision to admit Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements was not
harmless. An error is harmful if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the error "affected
the outcome of the proceedings." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, If 18, 977 P.2d 479.
Such a reasonable likelihood arises if, absent the error, the trial "may well have resulted
in a different jury determination." S.H. v. Bistrvski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Utah 1996).
This standard is met "substantially short" of where a court might conclude that a different
result was "more probable than not." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (1987). What is
necessary is that the error result in this court's "confidence in the verdict [being]
undermined." Id Further, given the unanimity requirement of article I, section 10 of the
Utah Constitution, if there is a reasonable likelihood that even one juror would have
voted to acquit after a trial without errors, then the error was not harmless.16

16

A slightly different harmfulness analysis applies with regard to Mrs. Zaragoza's
ultimate decision to testify. By the time Mrs. Zaragoza was called, the State had built its
case on hearsay admitted in violation of Mr. Zaragoza's confrontation rights. Although
Mrs. Zaragoza was called in an attempt to mitigate the harm flowing from the trial court's
erroneous ruling, it did not eliminate the error. Rather, in evaluating the harmfulness of
the trial court's error, the court must "6ponder[] all that happened without stripping the
erroneous action from the whole'" to determine whether "'the judgment was . . .
substantially swayed by the error.'" United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358-59 (10th
Cir. 1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65
(1946)); see also State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) ("If the taint is
sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict.").
Thus, it is no answer to the issue of forfeiture to suggest that the trial court's error was
cured by Mrs. Zaragoza's decision to testify.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

Given that Mrs. Zaragoza's hearsay statements constituted almost the entirety of
the State's case, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been
reached had the hearsay not been admitted into evidence. The State's primary direct
evidence came in the form of Officers Malley and Smalley testifying about their
observations when they arrived at the motel on the morning of the assault and about Mrs.
Zaragoza's condition in the following hours. This provided evidence of Mrs. Zaragoza's
injuries and the hotel room's condition when they arrived. But from these observations
alone, there is no evidence that establishes Mr. Zaragoza's involvement in an assault,
kidnapping, or domestic violence. Further, the State's only other direct witness was
Raelynn Ortiz—an admitted drug user who testified that she left the room during the
incident and, when she returned, Mr. Zaragoza was gone. Beyond that, the State's
evidence consisted of police officers who interviewed Mrs. Zaragoza and E.G. in the
weeks after the arrest. Setting aside the components of this testimony that constituted
hearsay, those officers could testify to nothing more than Mrs. Zaragoza's and E.G.'s
condition at the time they met with these officers.
If the State's hearsay evidence is excised from the trial record, there is a lack of
evidence about the duration and circumstances of the assault. There would have been
little or no basis for the State to argue as it did during closing argument that the jury
could convict of kidnapping because Mrs. Zaragoza was detained for three hours and that
the jury could convict of aggravated assault because there was a risk that Mrs. Zaragoza
would die during the assault. (R. 252:242-47.) With those gaps in the State's case, there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have doubted the State's case and a
different result would have been reached at trial.
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At bottom, the consequences of the trial court's finding of forfeiture permeated
virtually all aspects of Mr. Zaragoza's trial. Without any direct evidence to corroborate
such statements, the State was allowed to introduce hearsay evidence that Mrs. Zaragoza
was locked in her room for hours and threatened if she tried to leave. The circumstances
of the assault were recounted in detail by multiple individuals who were not in the room.
And although this testimony was inconsistent and, indeed, rebutted by individuals who
were present during the incident, the jury was permitted to convict based on theories that
were supported only by hearsay evidence. Had the trial court not erroneously concluded
that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his confrontation rights, it is reasonably likely that the jury
would have reached a different result. This requires a new trial.
Conclusion
This Court should vacate Mr. Zaragoza's conviction and remand this case for a
new trial based on either of two trial court errors. First, the trial court erred when it
refused to give Mr. Zaragoza's proposed jury instruction explaining the relationship
between the assault and kidnapping charges in this case. Because there was a sufficient
quantum of evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. Zaragoza was not guilty of at least
one of these offenses, the jury should have been instructed accordingly. Second, the trial
court erred when it concluded that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Mr. Zaragoza's conversations with Mrs. Zaragoza regarding their
spousal privilege do not constitute wrongdoing such that Mr. Zaragoza should be deemed
to have forfeited his constitutional rights. This Court should vacate Mr. Zaragoza's
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JUNE 4, 2010

1 :

THE COURT: Okay.

JUDGE MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN PRESIDING

2 ;

MR. COOLEY: She, additionally, she needs to leave.

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

3

may not be a c c u r a t e with audio r e c o r d i n g s . )
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: We are here in the matter of State of
Utah versus Jonathan Zaragoza.

This is case 091904897.

Apparently, her daughter needs to be at work by 3:30 and-

4 j

Oh, okay.

5 i

I think in any event it would probably be

6 ; appropriate to call her before putting on any, any additional
7 ', evidence or address anything else.

And this hearing, we're here today for a hearing on

8

THE COURT: Okay.

:

State's motion to admit evidence, basically the statements -

9

and I do have a question about that - certain statements made

10

by the victim at the time of the alleged incident, admit

11 ;

THE WITNESS: (Inaudible)?

those statements at trial based upon Mr. Zaragoza's alleged

12 :

MR. COOLEY: This is, this is just what we talked

wrongdoing in this matter.

13 ! about earlier, Christine.

It's a doctrine, an overrule of

MR. COOLEY: Just step up here in front of the clerk
and she'll swear you in, okay?

evidence that allows the confrontation issue to be bypassed

14

CHRISTINE ZARAGOZA

based upon the actions of the defendant and as it relates to

15

Having been first duly sworn,

the, not only the availability but also the testimony,

16

testified upon his/her oath as follows:

potential testimony, of a witness or a victim at trial.

17 :

MR. COOLEY: Would you like me to go ahead and do it

So, I have read the brief that you submitted and
I've also read your response, Mr. West.

And I have, I guess

IS

or (inaudible)?

19 ,

THE COURT: Yes.

I have a few legal questions that we should discuss before we

20 •

go forward with any evidence.

21 : BY MR. COOLEY:

MR. COOLEY: I think, I think one matter probably

DIRECT EXAMINATION

22 |

Q

What's your name?

23 .

A

Christine Zaragoza.

like to call her as a witness before we go ahead with

24 i

Q

And do you know Jonathan Zaragoza?

anything else.

25 i

A

Yes.

could be addressed first.

Christine Zaragoza is here.

I'd
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Q

Do you see him here in the courtroom today?

1 j three times.

A

Yes.

2 j

THE COURT: That's right. Okay, thank you.

Q

Would you point him out and tell the Judge what's

3 j

And now do you have any questions, Mr. West?

he wearing and where he's sitting?
A

4 '

He's right there..
MR. COOLEY: May the record reflect she's pointing

at the defendant?

9
10
11
12

Q

depending on what else the State intends to produce, I may

6

have questions

(inaudible).

7 |

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes.

8 j

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, just one additional thing

MR. COOLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

9 j and I discussed this with Christine earlier today.

(BY MR. COOLEY) What's your relationship to M r .

Zaragoza?
A

MR. WEST: Not at this point. Your Honor, but

5

in light of this, I don't anticipate calling her as a

11

witness.

He's my perfect husband I love very much.

12

However, she is still required to be here pursuant to the

Obviously, she can't be required to testify.

subpoena on Monday and Tuesday for the trial, along with her

13

Q

Are you legally married to-

13

14

A

Yes.

14 - daughter, Erica.

15

Q

- Jonathan Zaragoza?

15 i

Okay?

16

A

Yes.

16 [

THE COURT: Do you understand that?

17

Q

Is it your intention - we discussed this earlier

17

THE WITNESS: Yes.

18

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

your marital privilege and refuse to testify against Mr.

19

You can - sorry.

Zaragoza?

20

THE WITNESS: I don't want to, (inaudible).

today - if called as a witness at trial next week to invoke

A

Yes, I do.

21

(Inaudible conversation)

MR. COOLEY: I don't have any further questions.

22

THE COURT: So, and I guess this is what we need to

THE COURT: And you have previously submitted an

23

talk about.

24

the extent that, well, after we talk about this and after I

25

say what I'm going to say, at that point maybe there could be

affidavit to that effect; is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes, 1 did.

I think it was two or

10
11

A s , as I clarify this for you, Mr. Cooley, to

some proffer on, from you as to what you believe the evidence

1

right, it's a right that she has and can claim.

may show if we proceed with the hearing today, this

2

very different situation.

evidentiary hearing today.

3 '

necessarily based upon any action by Mr. Zaragoza, but its

4

based upon her invocation of that privilege.

The problem and the question that I want each of

9

Although,

10

you to address is certainly the Supreme Court, the Utah

5

Supreme Court and also the United States Supreme Court, has

6

position than where they were in Poole

recognized the application of this doctrine and of this

7

Supreme Court case of Giles,

provision of law that the defendant basically waives his

8

referenced in your, in your motion, the

right to confront a witness against him or her if he or she

9

has procured the unavailability of that witness.
In this case its true, even though they didn't

That's a

Her unavailability is not

I think that puts us in a little different legal
and also in the

and also the case that you

MR. COOLEY: I believe Montague

Montague.
was a espousal

10

privilege case and that's why I think its particularly

11

relevant to this

12

(inaudible).

THE COURT: Okay, so, you're right.

The difference

12

reach that point in Poole,

13

evidence and there was some indication that the defendant in

13

14

that case threatened the victim/witness, made some, did some,

14

the defendant in that case

15

some things that the victim was scared to testified or was

15

victim to change her testimony, not to invoke the privilege,

16

but to change her testimony.

it was true that there was some

16

encouraged not to testify.

17

situation than what we have here.

That, I think, is a different

17

Here we have the

had encouraged or solicited the

MR- COOLEY: There was also evidence presented in

18

that case

its just been reinforced again, Ms. Zaragoza is not going to

19

would get in trouble for it.

testify at trial.

20

of the Tenth Circuit opinion - the mere fact that there were

unavailability of the witness.

20

with that case though is that there was some indication that

Certainly, that has been, and

that he encouraged her not to appear as far as she
As well as - this is my reading

21

visits in violation of a no-contact order while he was in

22

and also a statutory right, which is a very different

22

custody.

23

situation than - or it involves a different analysis I think

23

the two of them during those visits was unknown.

based upon the invocation of that right.

24

the Tenth Circuit, I think pretty pre-approving them quoting

25

the District Courts note that essentially based on that.

21

Based upon her invocation of a constitutional

right

It's a right that

she has, even if Mr. Zaragoza suggested that she has that

The content of any conversations occurring between
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However,

you've got that wrongful behavior and then her decision, in

Courts phrased the rule this way.

spite of, you know, what had proceeded it to invoke the

I want to read it directly.

The defendant - I'm sorry,

This is the Second Circuit Court

privilege and based I think simply on that the Court noted

of Appeals, "was involved in or responsible for procuring the

that that could be found to have meet the standards for

unavailability of the declarant through knowledge,

wrongful procurement.

complicity, planning or in any other way." And I think that
that reflects that the conduct itself of both parties doesn't

There, there's one other thing that I feel like I
should note just because this is a relatively new issue for

even need to have been illegal.

the Utah's courts. And Your Honor noted the witnesses'

designed to prevent a witness from testifying and it needs to

absence needs to have been procured by the defendant. Also,

succeed in doing so.
THE COURT: But doesn't there have to be some

it needs to have been intentional that the procurement needs

wrongdoing?

to be, have been done with the intent that that witness be
unavailability, unavailable, rendered unavailable essentially

12

for trial, sorry.

13

THE COURT: Certainly.

And I recognize that and

MR. COOLEY: No, the defendantTHE COURT: - and encouragement to take a, to invoke
a constitutionally-protected privilege, or a

14

constitutionally-protected right doesn't - that's not

thanks for pointing it out.

wrongdoing.

MR. COOLEY: The one additional thing - and I, I
don't mean to interrupt.

There are any number of things that

Christine Zaragoza has every legal right to do.
citizen.

She's a U.S.

MR. COOLEY: I am, I guess, unable to see the

13
19

She can probably travel outside of the country if she wanted

20

That's not procuring something that is not

available to her as a matter of course.

17

She can travel anywhere she'd like in the country.

to.

It merely needs to have been

distinction between my example of him providing her with a
ticket out-of-town for the period of the trial, and him
providing her with the information and the encouragement to

That doesn't mean that if Jonathan Zaragoza buys her a

plane ticket to Brazil tomorrow, that he has not engaged in

assert a marital privilege.

conduct designed to prevent her from testifying.

both of them.

She may

She obviously has a right to do

I believe they're both constitutionally-

protected rights.

have a right to do something.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

But if the defendant participates - the Federal

:

MR. COOLEY: And there's absolutely nothing that I
can do to prevent her from doing that.

Obviously once she's

!

1 : could b e additional criminal conduct. In fact, I think in
2 I most of the c a s e s , there's at least the indication of

been subpoenaed then the situation change somewhat with

3 ; criminal conduct, and in this case I would submit that the

respect to her ability to travel.

4

But certainly, she's not

:

criminal conduct - clearly, there were numerous violations of

going to be looking at any really stiff penalties for not

5 • the no-contact order.

appearing on a subpoena.

6 I

j
;
j
j
|

T H E C O U R T : A n d , in fact, a new case h a s been filed,

\

THE COURT: Don't let anybody know that.

1 \ right?

MR. COOLEY: I certainly, I certainly will not. And

3

M R . COOLEY: Y e s .

j

9 '

T H E C O U R T : Yeah.

!

in this case,

I think that my investigators have made it

clear that there may be some other penalties associated not

10

directly with that.

11

j

MR. COOLEY: At least at the time of filing there
were over 190 of which w e were aware, not to include the

In any event-

12 .' visits at the jail.

THE COURT: But you have to acknowledge that there

13

O n top of that, I believe that the

conduct in this case clearly falls within the definition of

\
j
[
;
\

is a distinction between procuring non-attendance at a trial

14 ; witness tampering.

in violation of a court subpoena, in violation of a court

15 j

order and procuring or, procuring a right that is provided to

16

a witness in Ms. Zaragoza's position, a right that she could

17

take whether or not the defendant participated in helping her

13 : criminal defendant, h a s all the rights, certainly h e has

;

make that decision.

19

;

MR. COOLEY: As far as the rules of evidence are
concerned, an unavailable witness is an unavailable witness.

:

:

'

T H E C O U R T : And I guess that's where I'm going to
need you to proffer some of the evidence because I believe

\

that there is a very b i g d i s t i n c t i o n .

j

M r . Zaragoza, as a

every right available to him to, in his defense, and h o w he

20 i wants to defend against this case.

One of those rights is,

;

22 • invoke the privilege - the privilege goes both w a y s .
23 ' Certainly, you're not, and I'm not alleging that the marital

;
>
I
i

i

from my perspective, it simply doesn't make any difference
what the defendant did.

Obviously, in some situations there

'•

21 j given that h e ' s married to M s . Zaragoza, both h e and s h e c a n

A witness who invokes the marital privilege becomes an
unavailable witness for the application of Rule 304. So,

[

24 i privilege - he can invoke the marital privilege. But it is a
25 <' privilege that is applicable to both of them given that
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;

1

they're married -

cases. But-

So, my reading of the Supreme Court case, Giles

2 j
3 j California,

vs.

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, maybe just, just to

which I think is even a little more applicable

clarify, I could state that - and obviously it's a

than the Poole case, certainly, because, because of the

hypothetically - a witness who has not yet been subpoenaed

facts, and certainly that Giles

for a hearing, two witnesses, one who is the spouse of the

dealt with a domestic

defendant and one who is not.

6 j violence situation as well, seems to me to indicate that
7 | there has to be some sort of either threatening behavior,
some sort of physical action.

THE COURT: Dh-huh (affirmative).

Something other than a

MR. COOLEY: The defendant from jail calls both of

suggestion that you may take, you have the right to claim the

the witnesses. With the spouse, he arranges for that witness

privilege if this case is to go to trial. And you probably
11 I disagree with me in my interpretation of that.

to assert her marital privilege, refuse to testify.

subpoenaed, he arranges for that witness to just be out of

12 | seems to me that one, some of the things that the Supreme

14

But the

other witness, and again, this witness has not been

But, but it

Court said in reference to the application of the Sixth

town, to be unlocateable.

Amendment and the right to confrontation that certainly, even

is his conduct with respect to those two witnesses different?

Is - in Your Honor's view is that,

15 I though this exception is not designed specifically to protect

Because I would submit that his intent, or the goal that he

16

is hoping to accomplish and what ultimately he is achieving

victims of domestic violence, obviously, we all recognize

17 j that this is an exception that is going to be most applicable

in both situations is identical and his conduct is

18 [ in cases involving abuse, particularly espousal abuse.

identically wrongful.

19 j

MR. WEST: The relationship is different.

But we can't, we can't create two separate

THE COURT: (Inaudible) Mr. West, you can?

20 i exceptions - one for domestic violence victims and one for

MR. WEST: Well, you know, I think the Court's hit

21 j other victims. We have to recognize that the confrontation

21

22 | clause is, its, its, there's been many cases over the years

22

it on the head, and I think that there's a reason for

23 i dealing with the confrontation clause and how we think about

23

espousal privilege.

24 i the right to confrontation has been changed a little bit in

24

relationship with any, any other person-

25 I the event, in the wake of Crawford

and, and Davis and those

It's a different relationship than a
And I'm not going

into a long history about the reasons for espousal privilege,

1]

I

12

-

1 I the Court's very aware of those, but that they're not the

by its very nature, involves two people.

2 j same because the relationship between any other witness and

I, I was trying to make the distinction that its not Mr.

3

Zaragoza's right to claim the privilege. And, and you're

relationship between man and wife are different. And society

4 I has a certain interest in maintaining the relationship

correct in that.

5 j between man and wife.
6 j

That, that's what

But the reason that a spouse can invoke the

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, the one additional thing

privilege not to testify against their spouse is to protect

7 ! that I just feel like it would be appropriate to note. There

the, as Mr. West points out, the marriage relationship

8 i are two marital privileges.

itself.

There's one with respect to

9 I confidential communications.

We can't, that doesn't - I know times are changing

and things, and that doctrine itself has been called into

10 j

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

11 I

MR. COOLEY: That one belongs to the defendant.

question given, you know, cases such as this where there are
allegations of domestic violence.

And we understand,

12 j Anything he told his wife in confidence during the

12

certainly, that there are many factors and many things that

13 ! relationship, that's his right.

13

go into abusive relationships as are alleged here.

14 j

THE COURT: Right.

14

privilege itself has not ever been abolished and the reason

15 ;

MR. COOLEY: The marital privilege in this case is

15

for the protection is to protect the marriage and to protect

But the

16

that entity which by its very nature involves two people.

17 ! Christine's right and hers alone to assert or to refuse to

17

That's the point that I was trying to make.

18 j assert.

18

16 I not his right.

It has nothing to do with him.

It's

So, I don't, I guess I disagree with the Court's, at

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

19 j least the definition of it as being sort of a two-way thing.

19

THE COURT: So.

20 i In this case, only one individual's marital right is at issue

20

MR. COOLEY: And, and I would, I just rather not go

21 | and that's Christine's, and it is hers and hers alone to

21

into the policy and the history behind the marital privilege.

22 | invoke.

22

But it is, it is the State's position that a defendant who

23

persuades a witness to make him or self, him or herself

24 | talking about spouses, that's the reason why there is the

24

unavailable for trial based upon the clear policy of rule of

25 j privilege in the first place is to protect that relationship

25

forfeiture by wrongdoing gives up necessarily the right to

23 !

THE COURT: But given the fact that its, we're
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14

1

THE COURT: Right

essentially object to that witness's statements coming in at

2 ! trial.

MR. COOLEY

They, they've encouraged a witness to be unavailable.

And so

I thJ nk that the logical connection is

the ques tion whether she's invoking the privilege because of

3 | They shouldn't be able to then claira that they should be able
to confront that witness with respect to all of their

his actions or because it was a decision reached

statements because the witness is unavailable because of

independently by herself, I-

their conduct. And 1 think that that, I think that that

6

applies in this case.

7

to go there.

8

evidence to suggest that she has been threatened or to

9

suggest that she, she better take that privilege or else?

10

MR. COOLEY: What if she were bribed?

THE COURT: Well, and I guess that's the very heart
of what we're talking about is, is Ms. Zaragoza unavailable
10 j because she's been encouraged to be so, allegedly.
11 j haven't yet had any evidence on this.

We

Is she unavailable

12 j because she's been encouraged to be so by Mr. Zaragoza?

Or

THE COURT: And I don't know that there's any reason

11

THE COURT: Or bribed, or-

12

MR. COOLEY: What if-

13 I is she unavailable because she's taking the privilege?

13

14 I

I see that there's a difference between those two.

14

15

MR. COOLEY: Can I rephrase it like this, is Ms.

THE COURT: - some other evidence of wrongdoing
other than the suggestion that she take, she do something
that she is legally entitled to do.
MR. COOLEY: What if she was assured that the

16 I Zaragoza asserting the privilege because of the defendant or
17 j because of herself?

Unless there are some, unless there is some

defendant's behavior was going to change and that he - it was

Is that, would that be more accurate or

never going to happen again?

IS j is that not at all accurate?
19

THE COURT: That's not at all accurate actually.

20 I

MR. COOLEY: Is she unavailable because of his

THE COURT: YesMR. COOLEY: - I mean, I guess I could say I'm

20

speaking hypothetically.

21

21 i actions because of his actions or is she unavailable - I

Would Your Honor like me to proffer

the evidence that the State anticipates presenting?

22 I think23 j

THE COURT: - because of her?

23

THE COURT: I think that that might be helpful.

24 |

MR. COOLEY: She's unavailable because she's

24

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

25

THE COURT: Do you see though that the point that

invoking the privilege.
15

I'm making about, I guess-

1 : referred a couple of times, I believe, to the conversation

MR. COOLEY: - (inaudible)--

2 ; that he had had with her.

THE COURT: - essence, its not to me a question of

3 I Page 9 of the transcript that I provided.

unavailability.

That, that's obviously, we're there.

got to that point.

10

12 :

We've

The question is, is that unavailability

And I refer at the beginning on
Towards the end of

4 ; the page there's a little bit of confusion about what Ms.
5 .; Zaragoza is talking about when she says she's worried that
;

procured by the defendant or is that unavailability procured

6

And, and there

7

saying. No, what I mean, as long as you know, the plan is the

has to be, in my opinion, there has to be some evidence or

8

plan is the plan, and laughs.

something to suggest that it was more than just a mere

9

you know what I mean?

because Ms. Zaragoza has the right to do so?

9

16

she may never see him again.

suggestion that she utilize the rights that she has, given

10

that she is a married individual going to testify at trial.

11 . crackin' with that.

See what I'm saying?

12

13 j

The defendant responds by

Christine laughs.

She acknowledges, yeah.

He says,

The defendant

says, right, okay, so then I don't see nothing, nothing

I'm gonna skip down to Line 10 on Page 10,

MR..COOLEY: I, I think so.

13

defendant states, "Well, I mean, hey, I sent you, I sent you

THE COURT: And I know you disagree, but that's what

14

info, and if anything ever eomes worst to worst then you

I'm saying.

15

know, you go get some, you know, go get some legal

16

assistance, and, and you know the Constitution already,

evidence the State anticipates presenting today and I think

17

right?"

we obviously, I think we disagree on the, the exact standard

18 •

of the, application of the rule to espousal privilege case in

19

general.

MR. COOLEY: Well, Your Honor, as far as the

"Uh-huh (affirmative)," Christine responds.
Skipping down to Line 19, the defendant states, "I

mean they can push the issue, if push comes to shove, I mean,

20

you can't, you cannot make, so it's not gonna happen so just

21

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

21

stop, you know what I mean?

22

MR. COOLEY: But the evidence that the State would

22

sorry, not stop, trying to move on, just leave it the fuck

present today is that on January 30"- of this year a

23 '. alone."

conversation occurred that was, we referenced fairly

24 I

extensively in the State's memorandum.

25

The defendant

Laughs.

We're trying to move on so just,

Says, "You know."

She acknowledges she knows.

She says she's still

scared because she just doesn't want to get arrested.
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She
18

1 I states that she's thinking of writing a letter and she goes

"To laugh and grate cheese with you, cut onions."

2 ! on indicating that she has been working on that letter with a

the very last page of the transcript.

3 | friend.

The defendant tells her that would be a good idea.

4 j Tells her to "what he sent you."
5 ; what to say.
mean.

Then tells her specifically

"I am enacting these rights, you know what I

And I'm informing you, letting everybody know I, yeah,

The other conversations which have not been
4

transcribed.

5

19"*. I have a certified copy of the court's docket in this

6 ! case.

First, the conversation that occurred on March

March 19"' was the date of one of, I believe it was

and I" - I didn't understand the name of the individual that

7

the final pre-trial conference.

they reference after that.

8

that.

But he then goes on to tell her

9 j to get it there before the 12™, this is on Line 22 of the

This is on

9 j Corry.
!

The docket would reflect

At the time, Mr. Zaragoza was represented by Bevan
There was some disagreement in the courtroom.

And I

10 I transcript.

10

11 i

11 i incident specifically, but Mr. Zaragoza made some statements.

And I would, I would like the Court to listen to

don't know whether Your Honor would actually recall that

12 | that specific recording because I think that the tones of the

12 j

13 j voices of both of the individuals are somewhat telling us

13

14 j with respect to their intents, their, essentially their

14 I Then they start discussing Christine being subpoenaed to

15 ] emotional states and what's going on mentally at the time

15 j court.

He called Christine afterwards, told her what had

i

:

occurred in court about him, essentially firing Mr. Corry.

She asks him, "Should I or should I not?"

He tells

because I believe Christine sounds somewhat uncomfortable

16

her he doesn't think they're going to do anything whether she

about what they've been discussing.

17

comes or doesn't.

The defendant tells her,

It doesn't really matter.

Tells her that

18 i she's the only thing they have, and I think its safe to

laugh for me, twice and she laughs.

19

The defendant then goes on to talk about things

21 j consistent thing about the conversations.

assume that they is the State, and now its gone.

20

that he wants to do when he gets out and that's a fairly

21

The only

There was another conversation on, no that was
January 30'', conversation that was - conversation on

22 I additional note that I would make there is that he tells her

22

February 16" where - and I believe that this may have been

23 j that he really meant it when he told her he wanted more help

23

referenced in the State's memorandum as well, and this would

24 I in the kitchen.

24

be I would submit, the State would put on evidence

25

essentially that Christine at this point had been subpoenaed

25 ! her.

(Inaudible) tells him that means a lot to

Says that he wants her right there by me, helping me.

!

20

' is

to two separate court hearings on two different occasions,

1

because you're in jail, you'll say whatever you've got to

had twice failed to appear pursuant to those subpoenas.

2

say."

3

are "When you, when you're in front of my face, what's gonna

February 16th they have the conversation wherein

But what happens when you get out?

she mentions to the defendant that they're looking for her

4 . fuckin' happen?"

too because of their little dispute.

5 I

That's in reference to

And the defendant proceeds to tell her yet again

a common acquaintance, friend of hers, (inaudible) calling

6 ' that he was dead before.

her Angelina.

7

he's changed.

this in these notes, but says essentially. So they're in the

8

the future essentially.

same damn boat as us?

9

The defendant says - and I didn't put notes of

She says. Yeah, but not as bad.

All

Her exact words

He talks about the religion, that

And that he is not going to behave that way in

And I would submit that beyond the, what I believe

And the defendant

10

proceeds to explain to her the possible penalties associated

11

from providing information in a criminal proceeding, and

with that particular offense.

12

beyond the no-contact order violations, all, all of these

he did was put his hands around her neck.

is witness tampering, conduct designed to prevent a witness

13

communications were in violation of a no-contact order.

conference on February 12"- that's also, that's reflected in

14

every time the defendant called Christine, he knew it was

the docket.

Christine was subpoenaed for that and did not

15

another third degree felony to have a conversation with her.

She was also subpoenaed for the next (inaudible) but

16

Beyond that there's this manipulation that's going on.

The other things, there was a final pre-trial

appear.

That

The

17

the trial was bumped.

The subpoena was not recalled and she

17

defendant telling Christine that he's changed; that he's a

18

did not appear nor did she, nor did her daughter. Erica, for

18

new man; that he's not going back to his old ways.

19

either of those in spite of having been served.

19

20

February 16", in subsequent conversation, and this

20

He speaks in that same conversation as well as some
others which I'd rather just not play 190 conversations for

21

is, this is I believe reflective of the. Your Honor indicated

21

the Court, but questions whether she's forgiven him.

22

wrongful behavior in order to establish forfeiture by

22

her that he has forgiven her.

23

wrongdoing.

23

that he's dealing with his issues; that he's not going to

24

expresses some apprehension about what can happen when the

24

behave that way again.

25

defendant gets out of jail.

25

other actual criminal behavior, there's, there are constant

This particular conversation, Christine

She says, "You'll say anything
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Tells

And constantly reassures her

So I would submit that beyond the

going to essentially run things to get him off on the

undertones of emotional and psychological manipulation going
2 j on to reassure her and to keep her on his side.

charges.

3 !

being unavailable as a witness at trial.

The one additional thing that I would, I would just

And ultimately, that is what has lead to Christine

proffer and I think that this would be reflected - obviously,

THE COURT: May I ask you one more question?

Mr. Corry is not here, but I discussed this with Christine

MR. COOLEY: Yes.

earlier this morning.

THE CODRT: Mr. Cooley, assuming, I guess assuming

Christine did appear back in July of

last year at preliminary hearing.
believe, at that point.

the Court does find forfeiture by wrongdoing on the part of

Ke discussed it, I

Mr. Zaragoza, how do you anticipate - and you may have

She was aware that she could not be

forced to testify against Jonathan.
the police department was there.

addressed this in the brief and I just don't remember, sorry,

The victim advocate from

Counsel was there from the

10

it's been awhile since I've looked at this.

How do you

district attorney's office. And we spoke with her and

11

intend to get, is it just under the residual exception of the

12 | ultimately she decided in order to protect herself and her

12

hearsay rule?

13 ! child that she would be willing to testify.

13 !

She didn't

preliminary hearing on the State's offer.

But at that point

14

THE CODRT: - or present sense impression or?

I

MR. COOLEY: I would ask the Court to adopt the

15
16 j majority rule.

Christine was willing to testify.
17 j

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I would ask the Court-

!

testify at that hearing because the defendant waived his

So, something has occurred in-between that time and

The federal, the federal system, and I'm

sorry if this wasn't clear in my brief-

17

18 j now to sway Christine to essentially - and I'm not going to

18

THE COURT: It was.

19 j state, but essentially the motivating factors at the time, I

19

MR. COOLEY: In the federal system it's a rule of

20 i think that she still recognizes that those are concerns.

20

evidence.

21

you know, first in i?eynoids and now in GiJes, recognized that

But

21 j something between now and then has operated to change
22 j Christine's mind.

And I would submit that based on the

Constitutionally speaking, U.S. Supreme Court has,

it is an exception to the constitutional, the confrontation

23 j evidence the State would provide at this hearing, that that,

clause of the Constitution.

Utah Supreme Court made the,

24 i that mechanism was the defendant's emotional manipulations,

24

acknowledged the same with respect to the Utah Constitution

25 i his planning with her what they're going to do, how they're

25

of rule.

So, it's an exception to the U.S. and the Utah

I
I

23

MR. COOLEY: Well, the analysis is marginally the

Constitutions, independent of the rules.
In the federal system, forfeiture by wrongdoing is
a rule of evidence.
hearsay.

same because they're intended to, they're designed to protect

It's an exception to the rule against

So in the federal system, once forfeiture by

exactly the same interest.

The danger of a defendant being

4 j convicted based upon unreliable evidence. And I think the

wrongdoing has been established, it operates as a double

5 | federal courts have made it pretty clear that - the

waiver of both confrontation challenges and hearsay

6 | consideration given to a rule based on the Constitution

objections.

And obviously. Rule 403 still applies.

Rule

402, 401, relevance and, you know, there has to be some way

7
8

should, its obviously going to be greater than what you're
;

going to give to some state rules, whether they're the model

in prejudicial versus probative value which essentially means

9

rule, adopted (inaudible) jurisdictions or whether your, you

that things that aren't reliable are inherently unreliable to

10

know. New York and you've got to, you go through centuries of

- and some hearsay is just so unreliable that it shouldn't be

11 . case law to figure out what the rules of evidence are.

admitted because it's prejudicial value substantially

12

outweighs the probative value. That is the rule in the

13 ; given greater credence than an evidentiary rule. And so

federal system.

14 : because they're designed to protect against the same danger,

I did point out in my brief that a number of

Obviously, a rule with constitutional weight is

15 . once the defendant is found to have forfeited the

states, I believe about ten, maybe a dozen states, have

16

constitutional right, then the hearsay rules just don't,

adopted similar evidentiary rules. And that's just what I

17

don't present any sort of obstacle, there's no reason to

was able to find.

18

apply the hearsay rule because then you're just allowing a

So, those states had actually explicitly

adopted exceptions to the evidentiary hearsay rules in their,

19 j benefit from the wrongdoing in a slightly different kind of a

20

their state rules of evidence.

20 • way.

21

of states that have addressed it in case law have also found

21 I

THE COURT: Okay.

22

it operates as a double waiver.

22 |

MR. COOLEY: The one additional thing, like I said,

23

I was able to find which - sorry.

24
25

Moreover, the vast majority

There were three states that

THE COURT: Aren't those two separate analysis
though?

Analyses?

23 ' three states have applied the hearsay rules.

I would submit

24 | that California rules of evidence are unintelligible enough
25

that they should just be entirely disregarded.
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The other two
26

1 j - and in all three I was unable to find a single case where

made his argument chiefly, it seemed to me, based on a number

2 ! the hearsay rule identified subsequent to finding the

of other conversations that weren't transcribed.

3 I forfeiture by wrongdoing such that any hearsay was excluded.

these are all proffers without any foundation. Counsel has

There's -

4 ! In fact, in most of the cases, the residual exception was

taken great liberty to say what he thinks has happened to Ms.

5 ! used.

Zaragoza when she's right here in the courtroom. And if

I've never seen a Utah case where the residual

6 j exception has been used.

I didn't look around very much, but

there's any question about whether she was threatened or

7 ! its not, in my experience, used at all.

cajoled or in anyway pushed into doing something that she

8 j

otherwise didn't want to do, she's right here to be examined

So, I think that that strongly evidences those

9 j states' reluctance to wholeheartedly enforce the hearsay
10 | rule.

on the issue. And I don't think we should go based on this
conjecture and speculation.

I mean, those two or three states' endorsement of

If the Court is concerned about the arguments made

11 i applying hearsay rules after a finding of forfeiture. My, my

11

12 | analysis, my reading of it is that they're essentially saying

12

by counsel, I think that we should put her on the stand and

13 | once a defendant has forfeited there should be some

13

find out.

14 i consideration given to the reliability.

14

THE COURT: But she's already invoked the privilege.

15 ! circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and has the best

15

MR. WEST: Well, to testify against him.

16 ; evidence and the State presented it, it should come in.

16

17 j

THE COURT: Thank you.

i
17 | threatened.

18 |

MR. WEST: Your Honor, I don't know if I, if I'm

But if it has some

But she

could, she could certainly testify as to whether she has been

18 !

THE COURT: Nope, you don't get it both ways.

19 ; going to make things worse or better, so. Maybe you can tell

»!

MR. WEST: Well-

20 i me just-

20 j

THE COURT: Either she's going to testify or not.

21 |

MR. WEST: Well, and the whole, the whole reason - I

21 j

THE COURT: I (inaudible)-

22 i

MR. WEST: - you made up your mind and, maybe shut

22 j know Mr. Cooley doesn't want to get into that, but the whole

23 | up and I will.

23 | reason for the marital privilege is to preserve marriages.

24 |

24 ! And whether that is our cake or not is for the academia to

But I, one thing that I'find troubling, the State

25 ! has provided a transcript from one conversation, but then has
j

argue. That's, in fact, the basis for the marital privilege.

27

1 j

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

1 ! that, caused her to absent herself. And then further you

2 |

MR. WEST: And the way I see Mr. Cooley's argument

2 I have to find that it was his intent to cause her to absent

3 j is that Mr. Zaragoza is damned if he does and damned if he

3 j herself. And I just don't think we can get there based on

4 | doesn't.

4 j the information the Court has or the information that's

It's apparent from a lot of these conversations

5 j that both he and Christine got religion. They're trying to

5 j available.

6 I better their lives. They're trying to work on their

6 \

7

7 ! might be here for awhile. As I've already stated -

relationship.

They're trying to make things so that they'll

8 • work out together. And Mr. Cooley wants to use that against

8 i

9

9

him saying that this is somehow an improper influence by, by

THE COURT: Okay. Well, hate to (inaudible) we

and is there anything else you wanted to add before
I, I'm going to sort of preliminarily rule. And then ask

10

Mr. Zaragoza telling her that he's working on these issues.

10

that you put on evidence because as I understand not only the

11

That he wants to get better.

11

forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine principle itself, and as

12

;

That he doesn't ever want to

12 : articulated by the Supreme Court, understand that its not a

have marital difficulties again.

13 :

So, the whole reason for the privilege, I think, is

13 : final opinion yet, but its as final as we're gonna get it

14 ! to keep the State from meddling in that marital relationship

14 ' right now by our Supreme Court in the Fooie case.

15 ; which is exactly what the State is attempting to do in this

15

16 ; case.

16 '. admitted in a criminal defendant's trial when the witness is

17 I

And I know that we've taken a little bit, and the

18 I Court is certainly more astute about these things than I am.
19 i We've taken a little bit different approach then the PooJe
20 j case.

But I think even under the Poole case, you've got that

"Out of court statements of a witness may be

17 j unavailable at trial due to the wrongful acts of the
18

;

19

the witness unavailable." And that is something that must be

20 : proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
;

21 I three-part test. And the Court's already found that she's

21

22 i unavailable.

22 ;

But then you've got to find - and it has to be

23 ' based on evidence, not on a proffer.

The rules of evidence

defendant and the defendant's acts were intended to render

sort of dual inquiry.

Those - its, its

But whatever.

Three, three things we have to look at. First,

23 ; whether the witness is unavailable. As I've stated and as

24 ' apply in the Court's making this determination, that, that

24 ' we've gone on ad infinitum on this issue, Ms. Zaragoza is

25 I some wrongful act on the part of Mr. Zaragoza has caused

25 ^ unavailable to testify at the trial. She has invoked the
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•

30

wrongful because its something that she can do, she has the

privileged, the marital privilege, rendering her unavailable
2 I to testify at the trial that is scheduled on Monday.

right to do - if the decision to invoke that privilege or her

3 !

getting up on the stand today and making that determination

The question that the Court intends to pursue at

was caused by wrongful acts of Mr. Zaragoza, then I believe

4 • this point based upon the proffer of information and evidence

that the doctrine, or the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine

5 j provided by Mr. Cooley and the inquiry that I believe is

or whatever its, whatever it is, this, this issue, I believe

relevant and pertinent, and that is to determine whether the
invocation of that privilege by Ms. Zaragoza was due to the

that you could show that the statements are admissible based

wrongful acts of Mr. Zaragora. The fact, I do believe that

upon his wrongdoing.

it is significant that Ms. Zaragoza has invoked the privilege

So, I think what we need to do is we need to go

herself. It's a privilege that is applicable to her, but the

forward and the State needs to - and as Mr. West points out

11 j very nature of invoking that privilege is a Constitutional

that this is, we do have to proceed by the rules of evidence,

12 j right. It is a statutory right.

and you know, foundation has to be laid and whether or not

It is something that she is

phone calls and, I assume there in this (inaudible) but you

13 j - whether or not that invocation was at the request or at

still need lay the foundation and you need to do what you

14 j the, at the suggestion of Mr. Zaragoza, I don't believe that
15 ; that makes.it wrongful.

15

16 |

16

What I do believe makes that invocation wrongful

MB. COOLEY: So the State would first call Dirk

17 j Roesler. Also, Your Honor, if I may approach?

17 j would be if there was some pressure put on her by Mr.
18 | Zaragoza.

need to do to get them in.

If there were, as Mr. Cooley stated, if there was

A certified copy of the docket in this case.

19 j some bribery going on. If there was emotional manipulation.

19 j

20 J If there was a discussion between the two of them, an

20 !

understanding, a recognition that her invoking the privilege

THE COURT: Oh, thank you.
DIRK ROESLER
Having been first duly sworn,

21 j

is going to render the case, the State's case null.

testified upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

If there is, if the State can prove by a
24 j preponderance of the evidence that the invocation of that

24 ; BY MR. COOLEY:

25 j privilege by Ms. Zaragoza was wrongful - and it can't be

25

Q

Would you please tell the Judge your full name?

31

A

32

I'm Sergeant Dirk Roesler with the Unified Police

1 ; respect to phone calls recorded, outgoing phone calls
2 : recorded at the jail?

Department.
Q

How do you spell your last name, Mr. Roesler?

3 i

A

As far as how I obtain them or what?

A

R-O-E-S-L-E-R.

4 <

Q

Well, first off, are you involved in the actual

Q

Where do you work?

5 j recording of the phone calls?

A

Unified Police Department doing jail

investigations.

6 j

When I receive a request for phone calls, I am the

7 i one that downloads those from the server from VAC.

8

Q

What are your responsibilities there?

j

8

9

A

Investigate and pursue charges against offenses

;

9

10

A

j

Q

But are the calls themselves automatically recorded

or does there have to be some request to record the calls?

committed at the jail and also facilitate and act as go-

i

10

A

They're automatically all recorded.

between between outside agencies and obtaining information

;•

11 ;

Q

And are they automatically stored on that server

where the jail is the custodian of those records.

i

12 ' off site?

j

13 ;

A

Automatically all stored.

j

14 i

Q

Okay.

Besides housing histories and offenses, things like

!

15 j marked as State's Exhibit 1.

that, also the recorded telephone calls from - outgoing calls

j

16 |

A

I do.

from the inmate telephones.

Q

What sorts of information does the jail keep track

of?
A

I've just-put in front of you what's been
Do you recognize that document?

!

17 |

Q

What is it?

Q

Are all outgoing calls from the inmates recorded?

j

18 I

A

That's a standard request from an outside

A

From all inmate phones that they have access to,

|

19 | investigator agency for phone calls from the jail, with a
20 j GRAMA release notification at the bottom.

Okay. And are those recordings stored somewhere

|
i
j
j

22 i this case?

!

23 ••

A

This one does.

j

24 :

Q

What information was provided in regard to the

yes.
Q
centrally?
A

They're stored in a central server by the company

that we contract services with.
Q

Okay. What, what do you do specifically with

21 |

Q

Okay.

Does that request relate specifically to

25 I requested phone calls that you utilized in -
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1 (

A

Created.

nature of the offense, what the case number, the inmate's

2

Q

Okay.

name, identification numbers. And then it specifically

3

looking at?

provides the phone numbers that they request me to check

4

from.

5

A

For this it tells me who the requesting agency is,

The calls are made, or searched by kind of a reverse

number, by outgoing call number, not assigned inmate number.
Q

Okay.

I'm now showing you what has been marked as

State's Exhibit 2.
9
10

A

Yes, sir, this is a disk that I burned based on

MR. COOLEY: Does Your Honor need to see the
(inaudible)?

This is a standard (inaudible) access to the audio

files that are, individual files of each individual recording

6

that's saved on the server and then subsequently retrieved by

7

telling the system which phone number to search for those

8

numbers being made, outbound calls from the jail.

•9 !

this request.

11
12

Do you know what that is?

A

So could you tell, tell us what we're

Q

10

this.

11

ID.

12 I

13

THE COURT: Can you turn it just a little bit?

13

Okay.

Well, let's go column by column here on

The left-most column there, it says at the top. Inmate
Who's, who's inmate ID is listed here?

A

Those actually, those are, as opposed like I say,

system at the jail where they've got a PIN number, these

14

MR. COOLEY: (Inaudible).

14

Inmate ID's are actually individual numbers assigned to

15

Is that okay, John?

15

particular phones, banks of phones at the jail.

16

MR. WEST: (Inaudible)?

16

17

MR. COOLEY: No.

17

18

MR. WEST: Yeah.

18 |

19

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

19

Yeah, you've seen the?

i
Q
(BY MR. COOLEY) Okay, so I've put the CD into this
20 !
21 > computer and this is the program that came up. Is this a
22 I program that's just automatically launched when?
23 |

A

It is. A version of it is downloaded with the disk

when its burned.
Q

Q

The second one says. Inmate Name.

And I'm

A

Yeah.

Those actually, if you notice like Line 8,

that first column, 14 whatever 8, they correspond together.

20

It just corresponds, tells you which phone it was, in

21

particular it was made from.

22 j
Q
What does No Pin mean?
i
23 I
A
It means we don't have inmate pin numbers assigned
24 j like the prison system does.
25 !

Okay.

Okay.

assuming that Line #7 No Pin, is not an inmate name?

Q

Okay.

The next column says, Start Date?

i
!

35

A

the inmate would dial that number from the bank of phones

That's when the conversation was made and the time

from within the jail.

it was commenced.
Q

36

Q

So, for example, the conversation, the first one in

morning; is that accurate?

A

Correct.

Q

And could you just scroll down and tell us whether

That's correct.

6 !

Q

Okay.

7 I all of the calls in this particular report were placed to

So that would actually be when that
*

that specific number?

A

Correct.

Q

And would that be the same for all of the

10 I

A

That would be consistent for every entry.

12 !

13

Q

Okay.

13 !

14

A

That's the length of the call.

i
The next column. Duration?
A zero may or may

14

Okay.

And what - it looks to me like January 30''*

15 ;

16

conversation ensued, there may have because sometimes the

16 j

registers dial tones or a brief answering machine message.

17 j

What's the maximum length of a call from the

A

On this one it would be, yes.

Q

Okay.

So they all occurred on or subsequent to

. I

not even a one minute duration, there may not be, have been a

Okay.

They were.

Q

January 30''" of 2010?

15

Q

A

1 1 I is the start. Is that the oldest call on this CD?

conversations all the way down the column?

12

18 ;

So the, that was part of the information

A

conversation occurred?

11

Okay.

that you were given in the request?

that column indicates January 30™, 2010 at 8:23 in the

A

Correct.
THE COURT: How many calls are on this one?

Q

(BY MR. COOLEY) Do you know how many calls are on

A

There's 276 on this particular disk.

18 i it?

19

jail, ]is there a limit put on how long inmates can be on the

19 !

20

phone?

20 I on this bottom, or upper right-hand corner.

21

A

Each conversation is limited to 15 minutes.

Q

So 15 minutes is the maximum?

22 ;

THE WITNESS: From the jail to that one number, yes.

23

A

(No audible response).

23

MR. WEST: May I have just a moment. Your Honor?

24

Q

And then the last column. Phone Number?

A

That's the outbound call that it was made to.

22

25

21 |

i

It's up here

THE COURT: Are they from the jail to that number?

May I approach?
So

MR. COOLEY: Yeah.
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(Inaudible)

defendant.

2 |

Q

(BY MR. COOLEY) You just did this one today?

is identified in that recording.

3 |

A

Yesterday.

recording itself, given the Court's knowledge the individuals

Q

Okay, yesterday.

1 ]

I believe also the statements, the fact that he

should be sufficient to establish their identity, that the

So this would be up through

call is actually a conversation between the two of them.

5 | what was the date of the most recent call on this disk?

I have another witness who could testify that, as

6 |

A

On this one

7 | •

Q

Yes.

A

I'd have to go down to the bottom

to Christine's voice.

(Inaudible conversation)

He would, however, be able to testify to the dates of the

THE WITNESS: Looks like the last conversation on

subpoena service.
I don't know whether Mr. West would be inclined to
stipulate.

12 j calls on May 30'-"

I have the returns with me, but?
MR. WEST: I just want to voir dire on the-

MR. COOLEY: Okay. Your Honor, I would, I would ask

MR. COOLEY: Sure-

leave to just play one of the calls if you - sorry
THE COURT: So for four months, a four-month period

MR. WEST: - on the foundation

MR. COOLEY: January 30'" to May 3 0 ; \ is that

THE COURT: Sure.

BY MR. WEST:

THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 J

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry,

20 \

MR. COOLEY: No, that's fine
I, I would ask

Q

(inaudible)

21

A

J

22

Q

It's just to a bank of telephones?

i

23

A

It just identifies the phone bank, yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

(inaudible) to play one of the

24 : the State's memorandum.

I think that at this point the Court

I

j

j

25 ' has heard from Christine Zaragoza and as well as from the
!

A

40

i

I've

A

- sir, I've been doing this for about three months.

It tells me which housing

Q

But it would only be a yellow, maximum security,

I would have to reference the master list.

unit and even which - cause normally there's about five

that, where only one inmate is allowed out at a time?

phones, give or take five or six phones in the housing units

A

Yes, sir.

Well, there's different class, different

to be able to identify specifically whether it's the far

areas within max.

left, next one subsequently over.

only one per, one is allowed out at a time.

Q

Okay.

And those phones are all in the common area

of the, of the pod?

There's where the highest security area
And then there a

few other levels within the maximum security pod, which is B

It's not in any individual person's

Pod.

cell?

But that's divided up into eight different sections.

So they do vary some within those.
A

No.

These are all out in the common area - the

MR. COOLEY: Just to expedite things, I'll

housing unit, primary housing unit.
Q

stipulate

that at least in the defendant's current security level, he's

And are you aware as to whether there are numerous

no longer in maximum security.

They are a number of

inmates out in the common area when these phones calls are

individuals that are able to access the phones at any given

made or whether its just-

time and I know from experience, that listening to other

A

It depends on the individual classification of that

calls, as well as the calls in these cases, that sometimes

housing unit section whether, or how many inmates, whether it

there are, I've never heard of them fighting, but

be in the maximum security, only one person is allowed out at

occasionally inmates argue over like who should be able to

a time.

Where as other ones, minimum areas, its kind of free

reign.

23

And can you tell from that ID where the,

which pod this was.

j
39

got those - not with me though.

22

Not to individual inmates, no, sir.

|
I think it would probably be appropriate to play the,

23 | the first, well, the call that was referenced extensively in

21

So, the inmate ID number isn't specific to any

particular inmate at the jail?

j
22 i calls.

20

(inaudible).

VOIR DIRE

accurate?

21 !

But at this point the Court has heard

Christine's voice and I think that that would be superfluous.

(inaudible).

11 | this one was, there was three calls made, three 15-minute

18 |

The evidence in the

Q

And you, you are familiar with the, the color of

suits and how they pertain to classifications; is that right?
A

The only ones I can say for sure is the yellow is

maximum security.

As far as for the blue and the tan, I,

honestly, I don't know.
Q

Okay-

At this point-

use the phone.

So, Mr. Zaragoza is the only conversation.

19

will stipulate that the caller in these conversations on

20

occasion refers to other who are waiting to use the phone.

21

Q

(BY MR. WEST) So, you, you don't have anyway of

22

knowing by the records that you have pulled who was the

23

person who initiated the call, what inmate?

24
25

A

I

The only way I could ascertain that would be to

bounce it off against the housing unit video and make a
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physical or a visual identification comparing the times the

1

today, but I didn't see anything that I thought was, was not

call was made versus the camera and time on the housing unit.

2

accurate as far as the transcript.

Q

And you haven't done that in?

i

3

A

No.

I

4

isn't entirely accurate, but the person who did is it largely

MR. WEST: Okay. That's all.

}

5

incompetent when it comes to transcribing things.

MR. COOLEY: May I play one of the recordings or

•

6

reviewed (inaudible).

wouId-

7
MR. WEST: I'd submit that there hasn't been

sufficient foundation to show that this was, that these calls

•
t

15

I

Let me make a finding though.

11 :

THE COURT: Before we do that.

12

MR. COOLEY: And I would note just the fact that I

MR. COOLEY: When you say Number 1, Your Honor, do

13

believe the Court (inaudible) recognize that is Christine

14

Zaragoza's voice.

THE COURT: Yeah, that one.

15

Court recalls Mr. Zaragoza's voice from previous hearings,

MR. COOLEY: So this would be the call, at least

16

but in any event, she consistently refers to him as Jonathan.

17

And I think just the tenor of their conversation reflects the

18

relationship between the two of them.

19

sufficient to establish who it is speaking in the

20

conversation.

(4:10:36 - 4:17:55 - CD was played - not transcribed)
THE WITNESS: Did you want to skip to a certain

20 \ part?

21

THE COURT: No. I just didn't think that we needed

22 j to listen to the whole conversation.
MR. WEST: And I agree, the Court has the

23 I

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. COOLEY: Okay.

I will allow you to play a phone call (inaudible).

i

21 ;

9

THE COURT: I think we're gonna get to that.

16 I from this record, from January 30'h at - January 30l" at 8:40.
i? i
18 |
19 I

referenced in the motion, the memorandum?

10

14 | you mean the phone call that we've got the transcript of?

I

!

As I've

Could I skip ahead then to the portion that was

8

pertain to Mr. Zaragoza.

13

MR. COOLEY: Yeah, and the transcript, obviously,

24 I transcript.

I believe that, I mean I've listened to the

Moreover, and I don't know whether the

That should be

THE COURT: And this is factual, under the rule, the

22

pertinent rules of evidence, specifically, Rule 901, dealing

23

with authentication and identification, it really is factual

24

inquiry necessarily into voice identification, telephone
ersations and whether or not the State has laid

25 ! conversation a couple of times and I just got the transcript

44

43

4

THE COURT: But can.

sufficient foundation for the admissibility of phone calls

1

purported to be between Mr. Zaragoza and Ms. Zaragoza.

2 i

There's certainly plenty of them from which to choose.

3 i

•

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received)
MR. COOLEY: And I have no further questions for Mr.

I would find under the Rules of Evidence at this

I

And maybe you want to, but.

I would receive then Exhibit 2.

5 • point based upon my own knowledge of the voices of these two
individuals - I heard Ms. Zaragoza testify earlier today.

6 ; .

I've heard Mr. Zaragoza on the record during multiple

7

hearings.

witness.

I am familiar with his voice as well as the

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

references that were made in the phone conversation that we

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I do have one additional

listened to, the portion of the phone conversation that we
listened to.

witness, Rich Montenez, works for the district attorney's

I would find that the State has submitted the

12 ! requisite authentication, information that authenticates and
13 ! lays the foundation sufficient that these phone calls are

12

office as process server.

13

this if Mr., if Mr. West would be willing to stipulate, I

MR. COOLEY: So in light of that I would move to

number of occasions, including on April l*1, left a subpoena,

17

THE COURT: Is that the CD itself?

18

MR. COOLEY: That's the CD itself.

that that was not personal service, but he did call Ms.
Zaragoza, Mrs. Zaragoza and speak with her at the number

I (inaudible)

19

believe that Exhibit 1, unless defense counsel wants to have

20

it in evidence, it has actually an independent (inaudible).

23

Mr. Monten«z would be

testifying that he has Mrs. Zaragoza with subpoenas on a

admit State's Exhibit 2.

22

The evidence, and I'll proffer

think it will save us some- time.

admissible for purposes of today's hearing.

21

THE COURT: Okay. You can stay if you want.
MR. WEST: I don't have any questions for this

'.

referenced previously in Mr. (Inaudible) testimony and the
number at issue in those calls.

He called and spoke with her

at that number about the subpoena.

MR. WEST: No, I don't believe Exhibit 1 has any

He hand-served her on

February llrf for a hearing that occurred on February 12*'".

(inaudible).
And if the Court's found that there's sufficient

23

And hand-served her on January 13'h for a hearing which
occurred on February 17".

24

foundation then I really don't have basis to object to

24

25

(inaudible).

25

THE COURT: Tell me those days, again.
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MR. COOLEY: The hand-service - the relevant court

approximately ten minutes into the conversation.
(4:25:05 CD played until 4:25:09)

dates or the dates of service?

THE COURT: And I know this one has a transcript.

THE COURT: The dates of service.
MR. COOLEY: January 13:a, personal service.
th

February 11 , personal service.

Is there any reference in the transcript to where in the
conversation other than, I mean, other than for me to figure

And April 1", non-personal

service with telephone conversation regarding subpoena.

out where-

I

MR. COOLEY: - I believe-

believe he indicated it was a couple of days later. And
those were for the court hearings, essentially be February -

THE COURT: - where it's playing?

or April V- subpoena was for the last trial setting.

MR. COOLEY: - the partial transcript that I

10 | February 11th was for the February 12s*'' final pretrial. And
l

provided to defense counsel a couple of days ago there is -

u

11 i January 13 " was for the February 17 - trial setting.

my best recollection is that at approximately ten minutes.

12 j

It would be somewhere around the beginning of Page 10 of this

MR. WEST: For purposes of this hearing, we can

transcript.

13 j stipulate to that proffer.

(4:25:46 to 4:29:22 the CD was played)

14 j

THE COURT: Okay.

15 j

MR. COOLEY: In light of that then, Your Honor, I, 1

MR. COOLEY: And just let it play, I, like I said
earlier, I think that the last part of that conversation has

16 : think it would probably be appropriate - I would certainly
17 • rather play just portions of the recording that I feel are

some relevance to what I said earlier about the emotional

18 ! relevant.

manipulation in this case, but we have the transcript

I know defense counsel indicated he would rather-

19 j

THE COURT: Hear all of them.

(inaudible) defense counsel.

20 I

MR. COOLEY: - hear the recordings in their entirety

or we can just stipulate a conversation.
MR. WEST: I don't have a position on that.

21 : for purposes of maintaining, preserving the context of the
22 I conversations, the entire conversations.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we skip to another

But may I go ahead

23 \ and skip ahead in this conversation at least?
24

THE COURT: Yes.

25 ;

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

Like me just to keep it playing

conversation?
MR. WEST: Your Honor, my only concern with, with
going to other conver sations though is that this is the only

I'm going to skip ahead to
47
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i

!

1

1 ; complete transcript we have and I have no way to verify if

seconds of the conversatio i wi thout having

2 i things are being taken out of context if we just play

before and aft er, just so that th: ngs are m context
THE COURT: Maybe you carI do

3 ! portions and I know none of what to be here all night
4 ; listening to these phone conversations.

But I think that's a

THE COURT: Well, how about if we-

7

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, if I could?

6 J on March 19"'' at 3:41 p.m.
And I can

8 • understand where defense counsel's coming from.

These are

all conversations - I have no idea what the content of the
conversations subsequent to (inaudible) April 20:', what the

11 ; content of those conversations is.

That's when the CD that I

I would just ask the Court to

7 I note that that was the date I believe of a pre-trial
3 I conference and that would be the hearing at which Mr.
9 , Zaragoza asked to have Mr. Corry removed from the case.
10 -j

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

11 i

(4:32:32 to 4:39:45, recording 0319 1541 was

12

had prior to today and that had been provided to defense

12 j

played as follows)

13

counsel, that's when those conversations ended.

13 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

14

counsel's had those conversations for the same period of time

14 :

RECORDING:

15

that the State has had those conversations.

15 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Defense

Essentially,

16

they were provided to defense counsel shortly after the State

16 !

17

received them.

17 \ Jail.

So, defense counsel has had access to the

13

recordings.

19

office's ability to listen to that much audio.

I haven't listened to all of them (inaudible) my
But I don't

RECORDING:

Hello.

You have a BAC.

Please take call from-

It's me, sugar.

An inmate at Salt Lake County Metro

The use of three-way or call waiting will disconnect

18 ; the call.

This call will be recorded and monitored.

19 | the call for this call, press eight now.
20 | call, press five now.

21 : them together, just to provide context for the portions that

21

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Hi, sugar.

22

22 |

MS. ZARAGOZA

Hi.

23 |

MR. ZARAGOZA

What's the matter?

2. |

MS. ZARAGOZA

Nothing.

25 I

MR. ZARAGOZA

You okay, baby?

I think are relevant.
MR. WEST: Well, and I'm not suggesting that we

24 ' listen to all of their conversations.

But I worry about

25 , finding a conversation and picking a spot and playing a few

!
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To hear

To accept this

20 : believe that, that that means that we should all listen to

23 :

a minute or

MR. COOLEY . This is the conversation that occurred

6 j

10

you know

the

two of either side.

5 j problem.

9

you know

I
MS. ZARAGOZA:
2 I

No.

not cool.

M R . ZARAGOZA: Me neither.

3 j

And she goes, yeah, that's not cool.

I go, you

2

know what?

There's been a bunch of stuff happening.

I'm going to do is write her a letter, like I said, and put

So what

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm not okay.

3

4 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Huh?

4

everything in it, right?

5 jj

MS. ZARAGOZA: No.

5

went bad, and so I guess I'm going back on the 16'-'', right,

6 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, you said, I know, okay?

6

and-

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Well, no.

7

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Thirteenth.

8

MR. ZARAGOZA:

The fourth, okay, yeah, to start

!

Oh, you know?

I mean, no.

I just don't

7 !
8 | feel right.

9

MR. ZARAGOZA:

!

I know, baby.

Okay.

Anyway, so

9

trial.

All this stuff that I know that's

You know what I mean?

10 | yeah, I seen Julio and I fired him.

10

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

ii !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Oh, you did.

11

MR. ZARAGOZA:

And cause I'm telling him.

12 i

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

12

Yeah, I went up in there and

13 : just - yeah, uh-huh (affirmative).

You know, babe.

I just

14 i took care of it, cause I'm tired of this shit, you know?
M S . ZARAGOZA:

You have nothing done?

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

same shit.

Just a bunch of running his mouth.

I'm doing everything, man, you know?

13

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Well, the thing is-

14

MR. ZARAGOZA:

He had -

15

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Hey?

16

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

I'm like, you

17

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Oh, shoot.

You know, I mean,

If I'm doing

18

21

I was going to say.

talked to - you know, what's his name?

19 ! forgot i t .

I

His name - oh, I

And his name Julio -

!

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

20 i
21 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Mike.

everything, I might as well just do it all my damn self.

I'm -

baby, they - it's nothing.

The

He fucking said nothing.

know, dud, I'm tired of hearing you talk.

(affirmative).

(affirmative).

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Do you - can you tell the judge

22 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

23

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yes.

23 j

M S . ZARAGOZA:

And something - he said that me and

24

M S . ZARAGOZA:

What did she say?

24

25

MR. ZARAGOZA:

She - I go, you know what, that's

25 |

that?

22

!

(affirmative).

him should go.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.
52

1

;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I don't know what the hell is going

2 : on, but 3 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

Tell him - ask him why.

4 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

He just says that he - they don't

5 j want to put something - how do you say?
6 j up?

Cause I don't show

Yes, but I don't have to say nothing.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, okay.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

But I don't know.

9

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, you don't.

12

That's true.

Yeah, that's true, because I don't think that matters, baby.

11 j
:

''.

13

got pissed, cause he put his hand on me in court.

3

talking to the judge, and he put his hand on me and starting

And I was

4 i pushing me towards the door that you go back in?
5 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

6

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Not doing it, but he just started

(affirmative).

7 i pushing me towards that way, right?

7 '
8 :

10

1 i You don't get any {inaudible) and I do get it, and I really
2

Si

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

9

MR. ZARAGOZA:

And I told him, Man, don't touch me.

10

I mean, in court I just - I got pissed, you know?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

It doesn't matter how -

11 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, I don't think -

12 I

MR. ZARAGOZA:

There's no reason, dude.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Cause he can't make me?

13 | start pushing me.

14 j I told her, I says, You kno'w, this is my life.

Don't

You know, I've got something to say, man.
You know what

14 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No.

15 :

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Anyways, yeah.

16 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

16 i here, and, you know, people seem to think it's a game.

17 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I was like, oh, fuck.

17 ; know, stretching it, oh, 60 days.
18 i get it.

So that was today.

18 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I know, baby.

19 \

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

Hey, you know what -

20 '

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- I just came back and prayed and

(affirmative).

15 ! I mean?

And my family's life, you know?

That's a long time.

19 j what do they think?
20 !

It's not a game

Oh, 60 days.

You

You don't

You know, they think it's -

It's just, you know, easy?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Well, yeah.

While they go on

21 ! worked out, and, you know, - and this - but you know what,

21 ; vacation.

22 ; baby?

22 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Exactly, baby.

23 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

They do whatever they do, and then

23

!

I went in there, and I made a really good point, and I

think everybody caught the drift of that I'm not messing

24 ] around no more.

You know, I told them.

Man, like, dude, my

25 ; family needs m e , look at, man, this is causing a hardship.

24 ! you're just a file folder underneath the next.
25 ' goes

The next one

(inaudible) and throw him in the dungeon, and there he
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goes.

i Honor, this should have been done five months ago.

Start all over again.

2 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Right.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

But, I mean, like what if it's

! what I mean?

So I'm figuring over the

3 | weekend -

i
5 j stretched

[inaudible].

Like what the hell?

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, and then she's leaving.

Because I mean, I even told them.

know and I know.

She's

going to work over there with her dad - there on the 12 th .

8

Uh-huh

MR. ZARAGOZA:

know?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Oh.

11

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Like - well, that's cool, though.

Not well, nothing.

Look, come on.

He's farting around.

10

And I go, what's your defense?

I

You
Man, you

Stop messing around.

You're giving this dude just time.

this, do that.

9

9 j So see what I mean?
10

(affirmative).

They've got nothing.

know, and he's like well - no.

6 ! getting impatient with this case, huh?
7 I

M S . ZARAGOZA:

go, they've got nothing, man.

See, she's

You know

Really, it should have.

You

Sixty days, do

He ain't doing shit.

What are you going to use?

11

Ahh. I go, man, that's the same defense you had seven months

12 I think she's going to come back and do - because I think that

12

ago, and I'm the one that made - I'm the one that brought

13 | - mine always run on a Friday.

13

that defense to the table.

14 j to handle her Friday day, cause she's going - do you know

14

he's like -

15 i she's going to come back every Friday to work on her Friday

15

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Did you tell them that?

16 i cases that she has on the docket.

16

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I told my attorney that.

17 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

So do you think she will be -

17

got to - I can't use all that time in the court, baby, but,

18

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yes.

18

you know, I put it - I put - baby, you know I did.

19

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

20

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Mama, you know, I - baby, you know.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm like, oh, my God.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

But you could - you know?

I

So she's going to come back

19 j

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- ours?

20 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

21 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Or will they have somebody else?

(affirmative), yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:
not.

No, hub-huh

No, baby, I'm not.

know what?

(negative).

No.

I've

I don't know.

I'm-

They're

I'm not - I told - like no.

This - I told her.

And

I'm like -

22 I And we have to start all over again?
23 j

What have you done, right?

24

You

25

I said, you know what. Your

If - you

could see it, right?

55

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm just like.

Should I or should I not?
MR. ZARAGOZA:

I don't know.

were suppose to drop that.

I'm no. Huh?

almost 10 months.

I don't think they're going to do

to be in here.

anything.

| come home.
M S . ZARAGOZA:

I mean, no.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

|
No, I don't think they're

|

yeah.

12

I don't think it really matters,

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

11 j
12 j

baby.

13
14

Anyways, God, I'm - well,

•

it's exciting, a bit awful.

15

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

I don't even - oh, my God, Maroa.

I want to

I know.

I'm just counting.

I don't think it really

15 |

t

o

I know.
What?

Hey -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- thanks for listening to me.

j

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Oh, you're welcome.

i

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I needed to vent.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

No, it's okay.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I haven't any -

j

I needed somebody

-

I need you to -

16

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm like somebody talk to me.

17

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

13

]

19 !
20 i
21 j

18

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm fucking going nuts over here.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

But -

19

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

And see that that was the only thing

20 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I've been cleaning and cooking, and

The only thing that they had for their case,

22 j and now it's gone.

So what the hell am I doing still here?

23 ! You know, what I'm saying?

24

You

know, so what - I mean, doesn't anybody look at that?

that they had.

And they said something about the

jail one, and I'm like - I'm just like, you know what, that
was suppose to be gone if this one continued, you know?

j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

17 I

You got this letter.

This is

MS. ZARAGOZA:

i6 ; matters, because the letter - I mean, that's just period and I even told the judge that.

|
i

Hey, anyway, thanks for listening to me, sugar.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Well, the thing is that he just -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I don't want

I 11 - it's going to be 11 months.

going to do nothing if you do or don't.

11

Shit, I'm tired.

j Babe?

I mean, if - me, if I

go?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Come on, that's 10 - baby, that's

You k now?

They

j I'm just - oh, my gosh.
j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Hey?

i

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I love you so much.

I really

; appreciate that I have somebody that I can talk to. Mama,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
57
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

58

that understands, and thank you for just listening.
you.

I love

1

suga r.
MS. ZARAGOZA:

I love you too.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I know.

It' s been - baby, I

MR. ZARAGOZA:

11

13

Yeah.

MR. COOLEY: - it was (inaudible)—
THE COURT: - the final pretrial was on the 12"'.

7

MR. COOLEY: Right.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. COOLEY: Christine was subpoenaed for both the

10

that one?
MR. WEST: (Inaudible) I think that portion is
relevant in that recording.
MR. COOLEY: February 16'h, 8:51 in the morning.

But the 17th was initially the

trial.

9

MR. COOLEY: Do you want to listen to anym :>re of

14

THE COURT: We had a scheduling conference on the
17™ and then-

6

8

(End of audio segment played)

12

4
5

Did you know what ] was just going

to say?

10

MR. WEST: I don't have my file on that.

3

can - bel ieve me, I count too.

9

the 17*?

2

11

final pretrial on the 12™ (inaudible).

12

elaborate a little bit further and this, this is I guess just

I guess I could

13

outside of Mr. West's experience with the case.

But on

14

approximately February 8, Mr. Corry came to me.

Both of us

15

And I'm trying to recall, I believe the 12"' was the final

15

approached Your Honor regarding the appointment of counsel

16

pretrial.

The 16™ would have either been the day of., the

16

for Christine.

17

day before the trial was scheduled to begin and Christine

17

represent Christine.

18

didn't appear at the final pre-trial or that trial date in

18

19

spite of the subpoenas.

I objected.

And Jeff Hall was appointed to

He filed-

THE COURT: A limited purpose.
MR. COOLEY: Exactly.

He filed the motion as well

20

MR. WEST: Did you say February 16th?

as the affidavit which Christine had signed on the 4'-l:, it

21

MR. COOLEY: February 1 6 " .

was notarized on the 5". And as I noted in my memorandum,

22

MR. WEST: At 8:52?

those, the conversation we listened to in the very beginning

23

MR. COOLEY: 8:52, that's the time.

was on January 30™ wherein they discuss exactly those

And were those dates correct? February 12™ was the

things, getting an attorney and submitting the affidavit to

24
25

the, need-to-know people or whatever, I'm not sure what the

final pre-trial and was the trial scheduled for the 16™ and
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1

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Hey,

So this would have been the day, four days after

2

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I love you too.

3 I the final pre-trial conference when the trial was stricken

3

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Did you get a call this morning?

4

MS. ZARAGOZA:

No.

the day before what I believe would have been the second time

5

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, not yet?

that Christine failed to appear pursuant to the subpoena.

6

MS. ZARAGOZA:

No, but the car's gone.

transcript reflects, but.

and then it was set for a scheduling conference.

2-16

And then

(4:42:36 to 4:43:04 the CD was played)

0216 0852
MS. ZARAGOZA:
10

RECORDING:

11

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Please take call from-

MR. ZARAGOZA:

They repoed it?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

9

MR. ZARAGOZA:

They found out where it was -

The use of three-way or call waiting will disconnect

13

To hear

14

To accept this call,

15

This call will be recorded and monitored.

15 J the cost of this call, press eight now.

(Audio played)
MR. ZARAGOZA: - come out this morning?
(Audio stopped)
MR. COOLEY: -about two minutes and 4 0 seconds.
(Audio started)

Hello.

17

MR. ZARAGOZA: Huh?

Hi, sugar.

18

M S . ZARAGOZA:

MS. ZARAGOZA:

18 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

19 !

MS. ZARAGOZA:

20 I

MR. ZARAGOZA:

How you doing, baby?

20

21 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

All right.

21

22 i
l
23 I
i
24 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You okay?

22

25 i

MS. ZARAGOZA:

MR. ZARAGOZA:

MR. COOLEY: That's submitted to -

16

16 | press five now.
17 '

MS. ZARAGOZA:

(Audio stopped)

10

12

14 : the call.

19

Hi.

No.
Huh?
No.

I thought -

7

11

It's me, baby.

Okay.

8

- an inmate at Salt Lake County Metro

RECORDING:
Jail.

Hello.

You have a BAC.

I love you.

(Inaudible) money out [inaudible]
(Audio stopped)

MR. ?: (Inaudible).
(Audio started)
MR. ZARAGOZA:

- 4:30 this morning.

(Inaudible).

23 j Did you?
24 j

M S . ZARAGOZA: Yeah, I did.

25 i

MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, did she go to the bus stop?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
61
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

1 •

M S . ZARAGOZA:

2 I

MR. ZARAGOZA: How did she get there?

1j
2j

3 |

M S . ZARAGOZA: I took her.

3 j

4 !

(Inaudible).

4 | ahead

(Audio stopped)

5 i

(Inaudible from courtroom)

6 i

(Audio started)

7

MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, they let you use it?

8 j

(Audio stopped)

9 |

i
MR. ?: That's fine.

j

THE COURT: I didn't realize you had already skipped

|

Let's continue.

5 |

(Resume audio recording)

j

«i

MS. ZARAGOZA: (Inaudible).

j

7 |

MR. ZARAGOZA: They let you use it?

|

8

MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. ZARAGOZA: That's nice.

9

THE COURT: Do you want to just listen?

10 !

THE COURT: No , that's fine.
MR. COOLEY: Okay.

10

MS. ZARAGOZA: No, Angelina stayed there.

11

MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, okay, got yeah.

j

12 j

M S . ZARAGOZA: No, I (inaudible).

12

MS. ZARAGOZA: Because they're looking for her too.

i

13 !

MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, okay, got yeah.

13

MR. ZARAGOZA: They are?

!

14

MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative). Because they're

j

11 j

(Audio started)

14 ;

(Audio stopped)

I

15

15 i
MR. WEST: Sorry?
I
16 !
THE COURT: Do you want him to skip ahead or do you
17 : want to just listen?

[inaudibl e] -

MR. ZARAGOZA: Oh, God.

16
17

So she's - so she's now

she' s goi ng to (inaudible) down both.

18 i

MR. COOLEY: Sorry, I have skipped ahead.

18

MS. ZARAGOZA: Ah, yeah, but not as bad.

19 \

THE COURT: Oh, you did? Okay.

19

MR. ZARAGOZA:

20 |

MR. COOLEY: If we want to skip back.

20

MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah, not as bad.

At this point

21 , they're talking -

21

22 •

THE COURT: No.

22

MR. COOLEY: -about - this is something I mentioned

All right.

MR. ZARAGOZA: Hey, just tell her this, look to
avoid it all. just don' t even fuckin' go, babe, that's it -

23

that ends it. It's just done, yeah know?

early, they're talking about Angelina. We don't know who

24

mean?

Angelina is, but - and I'm not sure -

25

23 i

You know what I

MS. ZARAGOZA: Uh-huh (affirmative).

63

know?

1 !

MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah.

2 •

M S . ZARAGOZA: Well, yeah, it's not hardly even that

I don't know.
M S . ZARAGOZA

Hello?

3 i big of a deal because he just grabbed her by the throat and

MR. ZARAGOZA

Yeah.

You know what I mean?

4 ! scratched my face, but yeah, (inaudible) been there.

MS. ZARAGOZA

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

5 |

MR. ZARAGOZA

I think you need to focus on that

MR. ZARAGOZA:

It's still like a fuckin' zero to
more.

6 j five, zero to five or one - I think it's a one to 15,
7

actually, but I mean you could get it lowered, you know.

8 ; don't know.

I

Yeah?

9

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I don't know.

10

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, that's what I'm trying.

9
I'm

11

12 • little bit and see what's up.

12

I was suppose to - I thought

13 j to get a visit today, you know?
14

So what's up, sugar.

I'll see what happens.

It's been a while.
Have you been reading your Bible and

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I've been reading the women's thing,

but not really.

I haven't.

MR. ZARAGOZA:
know?

Talk to me. Mama.

MS. ZARAGOZA:
MR. ZARAGOZA:
stuff?

10

11 i going to call what's his name right now in a minute - in a

Have you been reading your Bible and stuff, baby?

I've just been - I don't know.

'Cause, I really wish you would, you

(Inaudible) been talking about God and stuff.

15 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Nothing.

15

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Not today, I haven't.

16 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Are you still mad?

16

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

17 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I'm just -

17

18 i

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Huh?

19 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I'm just - I'm here.

Mama.

20 :

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, okay.

don't even - huh-huh

how we slip, baby.
in our head.

I just wanted to make

You know that?

(negative).

that in my head, you know.

22 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

that, right?

23 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- I'm not mad.

25 | I mean?

You know what

I think that you just need to focus on that, you

That's how he gets

Seriously, think about it.

You know, I've been there all morning, cause I just

I'm not - hey, -

24 ! You know, I went in and just prayed and stuff.

And, you know, I mean that's

You know what I mean?

21 ! sure you're not mad, you know?

I'm really not mad.

You

don't know that much any more.

I'm not letting none of

There's been enough of all of

Huh?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I know.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, you know.

you know, what I read this morning?
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I was reading - oh,

I was reading - shit,

I'm going to have to show - I'm going

1

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm tired.

2 j to read it to you when I call you later, but I was reading it

2

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Baby -

3 i this morning.

3

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I don't want to wait anymore. I

1 I I'm going to tell you.

4 ! the past.

Oh, it says I'm not thinking of the things of

I keep my eyes on the future and things to come.

5 I You know what I mean?

4

That's -

don't want to wait.

5

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I know that, but no, that's fine.

6 !

MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah.

6

I'm not that - baby, I'ra not talking about that.

7 J

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know what I mean?

7

about, you know, your - you know, your walk with God. You

8 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I'm like scared something else is

8

know what I'm saying?

9 j going - hello.
10 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

11 ! baby.

You know what I mean?

12 I you know?
13 | past.

But he's talking about the prize,
He's talking about the prize,

He says I'm not thinking of the things of the

(Audio stopped)

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I'm talking about that.

I mean, you

You've got - you can have that

You know what I mean?

13 I

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

14 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You don't have to wait for it. It's

15 j yours, but just don't - once you do know about it, you know,
I
16 ; you've got be really careful, because now you know. You

MR. COOLEY: I did rewind that.

17 j

Uh-huh (affirmative).

0

12 ! right now.

14 ; know what I mean?

16 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

11 j don't have to wait for that.

I keep my eyes on the future and things to come. You

15 !

9

I'm talking

(Audio started)

17

know? And I'm sure that you've heard that in church, and I'm

18 j

MS. ZARAGOZA: Yeah.

18 ' just explaining it to you too.

19 j

MR. ZARAGOZA: But he's talking about the prize,

19

so you've got to be more careful, you know?

I mean he's talking about the prize. You've got to

20

that - I'm - shit, I'm lucky, you know what I mean?

21 | keep your - you've got to keep - you've got to - remember

21

wasn't careful, but you know once you know -

22 j what I was telling you once you know about it you've got to

22 i

23 | be like really carefully.

23 ! knew for a long time.

20 i baby.

24 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I know, but I've been waiting.

24 i

25 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, I know, baby.

25

Hey, baby -

MS. ZARAGOZA:

:

You know, that now you know
I mean, I know
Cause I

Yeah, but you know already.

You

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

And so like - you know what I'm

67

saying?

You just -

1

you that from the beginning, and I just want you -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

2 I

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- kept doing it, and - you know what

3
4

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know, I really want you -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah,

.5 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Cause I'm always thinking about

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, you're the one that hid - I

I mean?
because -

6

mean, I just barely found it, and you already knew it. And

7

so I mean - do you understand what I'm saying?

8

MS. ZARAGOZA:

everybody else, and I'm -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

And that's why I - yes.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, that's what scared me, cause

10

Then think about yourself, baby, you

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You know, I've got to think what's

good for me too.

11

like, okay, you could say one thing now, but -

MR. ZARAGOZA:
know?

9

9 !
io !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

12

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

12

13

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- you already knew before - way

13

that.

14

haven't, have I?

14 i before.

Well, that's why - that's why.

Yeah, cause I am thinking about myself.

Shit, exactly.

Exactly.

You should.

I haven't told you nothing different, you know? I

15

MR. ZARAGOZA: Okay, exactly, and -

15

16

MS. ZARAGOZA:

And so that's what worries me.

16

MR. ZARAGOZA:

17

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, okay.

17 :

MS. ZARAGOZA: No.

I understand that, and

you know what, and you should be worried about that if that's

18

19 ! something that concerns you.

I understand that. Baby, I'm

20 | not tripping on me, okay?
21 i

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

22 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I know, but. Mama, I'm talking about

|

23

you.

24

make sure that you - you know what I'm saying?

25

I am.

You know, regardless of what happens to me, I want to

that's really something important to me.

I mean,

I've been telling

18

Think what's good for you.

You know, I've been telling you

MS. ZARAGOZA: No.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Huh?

You know, I've been - I've told you

19

- hey, you know what?

All I - the main thing for me is I

20

just want you to be happy, and you know what?

21

stay focused, and I'll - I mean, it's so important to me that

I want you to

22

you stay focused on God, because you know what, baby?

23

going to tell you again.

24

That's fine. Whatever happens to me, happens to me.

25 : know what?

I'm lucky.

I'm

And you know what?
But you

I'm lucky. At least I know - you know, cause I
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1 f died, and I came back.

And you know what?

3 i what?
I
4 \ what?

I got lucky, and I got another chance.

know?

And you know

You know what I mean?

I mean, shit, look at all the time I've done.

time I've done.

And you know

All that.

All the

Look, I've never

Never had any programs.

Never got

any type of rehabilitation other than just going to prison,

I'm not going to hell for

right?

6 i anybody.

Anybody.

7 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

8 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know what I'm saying?

(affirmative).

I
9 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

10 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I'm not doing it.

11 I huh (negative).

All the prison.

went to any counseling.

I ain't screwing it up - and exactly for nobody.

5 | Nobody.

I do want to make it different, you

MR. ZARAGOZA:

If I wouldn't

2 i have came back, I'd have went straight to hell.

(affirmative).
You know?

Huh-

You know, that's why I'm doing all this

12 ! stuff that I am doing, period.

Not doing that - I'm doing it

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Right?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yes.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

(affirmative).

So -

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I mean, you already said.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

So I mean, but now - you

13 : so that if the possibility be - if I do get out of here, then

know, now that I've realized, well, there are things that I

14 • I've got a little head start on what I need to d o .

can do -

15 ; what I mean?

You know

{Audio stopped)

Going back to counseling and things like that,

I

MR. COOLEY: I'd like to {inaudible] that into the

16 I you know?

Because it's not going to just happen over night,
next conversation.

17 i you know what I mean?

MR. WEST: It was just getting good.

18 :

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

19 :

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I've been learning - I've been

MR. COOLEY: Would you like me to keep playing that?

20

learning - I mean, I am the way I am, because, you know, I'm

THE COURT: I would. I would.

21

a product of what was - what I was made to be, and that's not

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

22

a copout.

THE COURT: Is there much more?

23

doesn't say, oh, I'm the victim.

24

do is I do want to change that.

25

That - and I'm not playing a pity party.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

That

(Overlapping audio with courtroom)

No, but what I do want to

MR. COOLEY: Well, sort of a preview of - this, both

You know what I mean?

conversations - well, both conversations are 15 minutes long

(affirmative).
71
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1 \ and we're ten and a half minutes into this conversation and

just - I couldn't talk to anybody about it.

2 ' the next conversation is initiated immediately after the jail

mean?

3 • phone system cuts them off.

as you, and I'm not playing pity party.

4 :

THE COURT: Because it cuts them off at 15 minutes.

to change it.

5 !

MR. COOLEY: At 15 minutes.

So it's essentially the

j

I'm tired of it.

i

tired of it.

growing up, they -

7 •

THE COURT: Let's listen just a bit more.

!

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

!

9

THE COURT: - as to this.

10 ;

(Audio resumed)

11

You know what I mean?

I am - I was just

You know, the people, like I said, when I was

M S . ZARAGOZA:

But I didn't hurt you, though.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- you think - the people that you

10 | think love you are the ones that screw you over, you know,

MR. ZARAGOZA: - I have to initiate it and take the

12

steps, and it's not going to just happen - boom.

13

what I mean?

14 ; know?

Like I said, I want

I'm just tired of people fucking hurting me.

6 j same conversation, it's just the next call.

8 •;

You know what I

And I'm just fricking tired of people - just the same

You know

I've got to work at it, which I have been, you

I mean, I've really been - shit, man.

I'm going

I

11 I

and so I'm just like - I don't know.

j

12 i
i

mentality of thinking, and I know it's wrong.

i
j
'

I

13 j change that.

And that was my
I need to

So that's what I'm trying to work on.

You know

14 j what I mean?

15

15

through some really shit - heavy shit right now.

You know,

!

16

I'm going with John about, you know, me being molested, and

;

16

J

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

MR. ZARAGOZA:

But it's not easy, and I'm sure

(affirmative).

17 ; fucking, all that crap.

You know what I mean?

j

17

you're the same way, because you had a lot of stuff happen to

13

Uh-huh

j

18

you.

j

19

too, you know what I mean?

I

20

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

j

21

MR. ZARAGOZA:

So you're like, screw you, you know?

19

M S . ZARAGOZA:

i
;

(affirmative).

MR. ZARAGOZA: That I've never dealt with, you know?

20 ' You know what I mean?
21 j
22
23

you know.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

MR. ZARAGOZA:

And it's hard for me.

talked to you about it, you know?
you know?

I mean, shit,

I mean, you know, and I wish that I could have
It would have been cool,

And it just - I just had it all bottled up, and I

You know what I mean?

And I'm sure you're tired of it

(affirmative).

j

22

'

23 | is cause - or it does, because I told you.

j

24 j shit that I really didn't even know I - I totally like forgot

I'm sure that goes through your mind.

25 I about it.

You know what I mean?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
73
!
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

I'm almost positive it
I'm digging into

It's like I never really

1 i even really - it never even popped up in my mind at all.
2 ; was like kind of not even a memory.

It

Do you have stuff like

3 j that?
4 i

11

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

2 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I don't want us to just jump into it

3
M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yeah. Like my whole childhood.

I

again, and then like, wait a minute.

4

5 | don'tWell, I mean, I can't -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, that's what - I mean, that's

5

what I've been trying - I mean, that's what I've been trying

6 i

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

6

to plan, you know?

7 [

MS. ZARAGOZA:

But, you know, I - yeah.

7

still want to go work with Isaac to that trailer. You know

8 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, I mean I tried, but I can't

3 : what I mean?

9 ! remember for like - almost like five or six.
10 \

I can't

remember-

11 '

(Audio stopped)

9 *

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

10 '•

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, I've been doing what I can

11

MR. COOLEY: So this would be February 16 th at 9:07.

12 |

I want to go to counseling and stuff.

in here to do that.

(affirmative).

I mean, are you doing some of that?

12 :

M S . ZARAGOZA:

No, I'm not.

13 ; And like I said, it's a continuation of the last - of the

13 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

14 ! conversation that we were just listening to.

14 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Well, I know, but I mean are you

15 ;

(Audio plays 0216 0907}

15 j going to pay for it?

16 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA: - and you really - put it this way.

17 ; What would it take to prove to you that I love you?
18 I you - okay.

Just say this for instance.

21 I
22 | oh, yeah.

If I just

Boom. And I - would you believe it then?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Sure, baby, if I can.

I want you to make yourself

23 ! right before, you know -

18 I

M S . ZARAGOZA:

You know, I mean, you're not having

19 \ to worry about anything in there, because you don't - you're

21 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Right.

22

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I have like - I don't even want to

23 • explain it to you -

24 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Okay.

24 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, they have -

25 |

M S . ZARAGOZA:

To make sure, you know.

25 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- what I have to -

1

!
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MR. ZARAGOZA:
for free out there too.

They have it for free.
They do.

j could go get it for free , baby.

They have it

If I got out of here, I
I know all about it.

Y'ou -

j see, all you have to do is go down to Valley Mental Health,

1 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know what I mean?

Street Clinic.

(affirmative).
I mean, I've

I mean, I think - and then the Fourth

All that stuff is for free.

Hey, you don't think that I do that,

3 !

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I didn't say you didn't.

I'm - you

4 j know, I mean -

!
5 j
MR. ZARAGOZA: Yeah. Well, I know. Mama. I didn't
6
mean it that way. You know what I mean? I didn't mean it

It's not even a big deal.

learned that in here.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

2 i the same, baby?

; and they 11 give you an evaluation, and then they'll assign
i you a doctor-

11

No, baby, I -

20 ' - I mean, you know, it's there.

Arid you made - made sure you're -

I would, probably.

You know, I wish you would.

17 ; no.

Say I went away for

19 ; a while just to prove that, would you believe it?
20 : said, okay, fine.

16 ,

Would

I

The Fourth

Street Clinic can refer you to - refer you to -

7

that way.

8

mean is, I understand, because I'm in the same boat, you

9

know?

10
11

I mean, I understand - I mean, I'm saying - what I

I worry all the time.

you know what?
:

I pray for you so much, because

I know it's dangerous out there.

fricking drugs everywhere.

12 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Well, I can look into that.

12 '

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Right, and so like -

13"|

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know, but I mean, I just -

13 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- going in your ears.

14 ;

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, to me - I mean, I get more

14 i

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- you're here.

15

15 \ depressed 16 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

17 ;

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I get more depression just worrying

(affirmative).

(affirmative).

And then when all

this shit's going on and then, you know, I can't even say it

16 ; happened to you, because you're jumping my fucking ass.
17 I
18

18 | about you -

There's

There's all these people -

;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

When?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Well, whenever I have something to

19 I say or whatever.

19 ;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Right, uh-huh

20 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- and stuff,

20 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Baby, you haven't -

M S . ZARAGOZA:

When I have a feeling or a feeling

21 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Right.

21 i

22 I

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- and I shouldn't even have to be.

22 | or whatever you might not agree with, you don't want to

23 I

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I - and, baby, I agree with you.

24 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You know, and it's - and, gosh, I

i

25 ; can't even believe how bad it got - how bad it was.

fucking hear the thought.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

When?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Just that's how you are.
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But -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

MS- ZARAGOZA:

Or even if I am uptight or whatever-

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I don't give a fuck.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

How?

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, I -

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I fuck off everything.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Who said that?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You said.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, I didn't.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Go ahead and get in my ass, you

you mean that 's how I am?
MS. ZARAGOZA:

How am I like that?

What do

When did I I feel like I can never can tell you

anything.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

Babe?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

See, like right now.

Right now, I'm

MR. ZARAGOZA:
MS. ZARAGOZA:

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, because -

- and you're like not agreeing with

MS. ZARAGOZA:

What else you got to get in my ass

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Because, baby, you were -

Baby, I haven't -

14

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You're not even -

15 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

•- said nothing.

16

n!

understand.

I

18 !

j

for?
MR. ZARAGOZA:

13

\

M S . ZARAGOZA:
MR. ZARAGOZA:

I said I

That's not necessary.
Babe, all day you were mad at me.

1 and I asked you why you were mad at me.

What are you -

You even said you

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Well, you just said, when have I?

I were mad, and all day you were mad at me.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, because you're telling me that

j you earlier, you were mad at me -

19 [ and I'm asking you when lately, or - I mean, I don't get it.

|

20 j I thought -

! anything.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Even when I called

Yeah, and I didn't want to say

And then wher I spoke - finally did, that's what

happened.

21 I

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, like last night.

22 :
I
23 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Baby, -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Do you remember?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Because I said what I felt -

24 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Baby, you weren't saying any what

25 !

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, like last night.

you-

1 |

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- and you didn't agree with it.

was still - I mean -

2 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, you weren't saying what you had

felt.

You were pissed, and you were attacking.
MS. ZARAGOZA:

5

i attack

I was not attacking.

You weren'tHow can I

you when I'm telling you about my - how I'm feeling MR. ZARAGOZA:

You didn't -

Babe because you were pissed.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I know.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I don't want it.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

So it's like that's the same

So -

know, it's like -

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- or what I'm thinking.

MS. ZARAGOZA

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, you said what you were thinking,

MR. ZARAGOZA

I went in there -

9

MS. ZARAGOZA

Mine's the same attitude too.

10

MR. ZARAGOZA

Yeah.

but you didn't tell me - all I knew was you were mad.

Yeah.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You think everybody's attacking you.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No, I thought you were -

MS. ZARAGOZA

Just like yours.

12 ;

MS. ZARAGOZA:

It doesn't even matter.

MR. ZARAGOZA

No, baby.

13 I

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, what have you changed?

13

M S . ZARAGOZA

Oh, whatever.

14

MR. ZARAGOZA

Sweetheart, I'm not.

15

M S . ZARAGOZA

Okay.

MR. ZARAGOZA

I'm really not.

i
14 |

hung up on me.

You

That's the same shit that used to happen

15 ' before, babe.
16 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

And -

17 j

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, so -

I

not the same.
That's-

I'm not the same.

I'm not, Babe.

I'm

You know, I apologized three times yesterday,

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- that's not attacking you.
- what -

so that doesn't mean anything, and you don't think that I'm
catching stuff then, right?

because I said something wrong or whatever, right?

I mean,

18 |

»|

MR. ZARAGOZA:

20 j

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- just like stopping it. I don't -

2i i

MR. ZARAGOZA:

That's the same attitude that -

!

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Of course, it hung up - 30 seconds.

23 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Huh?

24 )

MS. ZARAGOZA:

25 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

22 |

What did?

Hello?

(Inaudible).
No, I didn't. Babe.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

23
24

Alls - there

25

Okay, I said that was wrong.

I must be a fucking fool then.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Huh?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I must be just fucking straight out

MR. ZARAGOZA:

No.

stupid -
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!

Whatever.

I'm listening to you.

it.

12

I just damn -

said.

just trying to tell you -

11

Because I asked -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I'm trying to -

82

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- cause obviously I don't fucking

understand shit.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

like wow.

1 i mean?
2

M S . ZARAGOZA:

So what if you were right here in

3 I front of my face?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Because you're -

4 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

What do you mean?

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- being so -

5 \

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yeah, what would you do if you were

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I'm fucking mad.

6

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Why are you -

7 •;

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I'd probably leave, cause I won't -

M S . ZARAGOZA:

I'm mad.

8 \ well, that's what I've been learning.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

What is up?

I mean, you're just

Come on.

9

What are you going to do?

here?

kind of break it up.

You've just got to

You know what I mean?

Take a time out.

10 I So you've got to just - somebody's got to leave.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know, what happened to all the

church, and God, and all that?

What happened to all that?

what I mean, to avoid the conflict.

12

leave and try to come back later - maybe talk about it, you

13

know?

14

really mean it, or what's going on, baby?

15

Hey?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Nothing.

16

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, do you really mean that when

17

you talk about that stuff, sweetheart?

And then I mean, -

You know

11

Did you just throw it out the window or - I mean, you don't

mean it.

•

My gosh, baby, why are you -

So I'd probably just

I mean, that's what I would try to do.
M S . ZARAGOZA:

I'd probably just grab the Bible and

say something, let's pray, or something.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

Well, that would be good too.

You

know, I mean, if - I would like to try that first, you know?

18

I'm just saying - I mean, you just ask me, and I'd just took

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Well, -

19

like that off the top of my head, but just the same thing

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- how long is it -

20

last night.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

- do you really mean it?

21

you were upset, I told you when we get off the phone, let's

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Fuckin' a, I mean it.

22

go pray, you know.

23

sweetheart -

Yes, I do

You know, there - I mean, I don't spend any of my

damn free time.

I mean, every - I mean, I'm in every damn

group you can possibly imagine in here.

You know what I

I - when you first - you know, when I thought

Babe, listen to m e .

Do you know what,

24

M S . ZARAGOZA:

Uh-huh

25

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- I obviously know - I don't know if

(affirmative).

84

you don't.

somebody's talking in your ear, okay?
MS. ZARAGOZA:

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I knew that's what you were going to

Babe, why are you thinking that I am

talking to people?
MR. ZARAGOZA

No. baby, I could tell.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Because -

M S . ZARAGOZA

No, you can't.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

What made you think that?

MR. ZARAGOZA

Babe, you know what, you say that

You don't even know.

7 | Antonio - you brought up - you said people's names.

MS. ZARAGOZA:

- I know you, Jonathan.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Oh, wow.

8 1

MS. ZARAGOZA:

And so what?

M S . ZARAGOZA:

God.

9 !

MR. ZARAGOZA:

So there -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

Wow.

10

MS. ZARAGOZA:

What does that mean?

11 |

MR. ZARAGOZA-

So then you're talking to people.

MS. ZARAGOZA

12
3

I 1

I'm in jail.

I know you.

Who in the hell

am I going to talk to?
MS. ZARAGOZA:

You know, when you get pissed off at

It doesn't even matter if - and

somebody, you know, I mean you're pissed.
MR. ZARAGOZA:

you're not?

You know?

You know what, you haven't - you

14 !

MR. ZARAGOZA

Your - no.

haven't forgiven nothing, because you know what?

15 !

MS. ZARAGOZA

And you're not?

still judging me like if I haven't tried to make any progress

16

MR. ZARAGOZA

No.

16

at all.

17

MS. ZARAGOZA

You don't fuck - you know what.

17

obviously then, right?

1
18

don't lie to me.

You're

You know, you don't believe anything that I say
Babe?

18

M S . ZARAGOZA: Well, I do.

19

MR. ZARAGOZA

Who?

19

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I mean, because if you don't -

20

MS. ZARAGOZA

Don't even fucking lie.

20

MS. ZARAGOZA:

In some ways, but it just kind of

21

MR. ZARAGOZA

Who in the hell am I talking to?

21

freaks me out, cause I just want to make sure.

22

MS. ZARAGOZA

You know what?

22

I mean?

23

See, that's how I

23

feel?

24

MR

25

MS. ZARAGOZA
ZARAGOZA:
MS

MR. ZARAGOZA:

You know what

I know, and, you know, I'm not the

one that -

ZARAGOZA
It doesn't even matter if you do or

M S . ZARAGOZA:
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If you say - I mean - well, look
86

where you' re at, and, of course. you're going to say whatever

you ve got to say, and it's just

You ' ve got to

But, you know what?

MS. ZARAGOZA:

You know, when you're here in front

4 \ come back.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I'm thinking.

I mean, I am.

I honestly am.

I mean,

I mean, I don't want

7 | to -

But you've got to think what

You know what I mean?

But you know what, baby, I am so thankful that I

5 I didn't die like that.

6 ! you don't understand how thankful I am.

of my face, what's going to fucking happen?

happened?

I mean, I don't wish

3 ; that would happen to anybody, because maybe they wouldn't

MR. ZARAGOZA:
be-

9

1 i happened to everybody, because they'd be in - their eyes
2 | would be opened the same way mine were-

8 i

You've got to think where

MS. ZARAGOZA:

I know.

I don't understand.

MR. ZARAGOZA:

I don't want to go to hell.

M S . ZARAGOZA:

You know?

I -

!

That you know - you've got - I'm trying to

9 |

I

10 i don't.

10

explain that to you.

I mean, Babe, I fuckin' was dead.

11

you understand that?

You know I was - I mean, I will say it.

12

I was probably in hell, you know, that when I came back to

12 ; almost died, and you've been - and you went through all that.

13

life.

13 ; I know.

14

know if you really understand how traumatizing that can be

14 •

15

when you really think about it.

15 j go to hell.

16

you really had a chance to really think about what happened

16 i and I've been blowing my whole life away, and I know better.

17

to you. Do you understand what I'm saying?

17 ! You know?

I mean, I probably was on ray way to hell.

Do

I don't

If it happened to you and

11 j

You almost - yeah, you

It's hard.
MR. ZARAGOZA:
I don't.

And I don't want - I don't want to
And you know what?

And why so hard headed?

And I know better,

I don't know.

And I ask

18

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

18 i God, and I don't know why, you know?

19

MR. ZARAGOZA:

That is just - baby, it - you know

19 : mean, you know, and if I had time, I'd love to one day sit

20

what?

21

but-

I

24

1

21 \ I had the thoughts and things in my head, and how I just
22 ; viewed everything -

MS. ZARAGOZA:

It happened to you and -

MR. ZARAGOZA:

- it would be -

23 ;

MS. ZARAGOZA:

Yeah.

24 |

MR. ZARAGOZA:

It would be a good thing that if it

25

25

MR. WEST: I couldn't hear you.

1 ; testimony, that's witness tampering.
2 ]

Couple of things that I would like to point out

3 ; from the conversations, some of the specific statements the
4 ! defendant makes.

During the March 19t;i conversation,

that consisted mostly of praying, those are the calls that I

5 ! Christine asks if she should go or not.

have listened to.

6 i doesn't think it matters.

Your Honor, I had Ms. Ayrapetova write this down
for me.

14

would like to listen to more of that recording.

MR. COOLEY: Unless you want to hear more of that,

And to be honest, with the exception of one call

9

(Audio stopped)
MR. COOLEY: That's, unless, Your Honor and Mr. West

37

that's all that I'm interested in playing.

10

I

20 ; down and talk to you about it and why I think that, you know,

I mean, I don't wish it would happened to everybody,

22 :

23

I have an idea.

"Witness tampering is defined as 'an individual

investigation is pending or about to be instituted.'"

7 ' During that same conversation describing the, his
8 • conversation there in court, he states loudly that they got
9

believing that an official proceeding, investigation or
I

He tells her he

They're not going to do anything.

nothing.

10

Indicates that she's the entire case and without

her we've got nothing.

think we can all agree that Mr. Zaragoza at the time of all

11 ;

of these calls as well as the jail visits, was aware that an

12 : believe indicative of the larger broader scheme of

official proceeding was pending.

13

manipulation, talks religion, tells her about a scripture

14

that he's thinking about that says do not think of things in

"Kith the intent to prevent or with the intent to

He also in that same conversation - and this is I

15

prevent an official proceeding or investigation.

16

induce or otherwise cause another person to," and this is the

16 ;

17

second prong there, "withhold any testimony."

17 ; when Christine told him that the, they were looking for her

18

Attempt, to

The statute itself for witness tampering doesn't

15 ; the past.
During the February 16 tn conversation, that was

18 ; too, referring to Angelina, because of their little dispute.

19

admit of any exception because the witness, or the other

19 ! He says, so she's, so they're in the same damn boat?

20

person that they're attempting to induce to withhold

20

21

testimony is their spouse.

21 ; just don't even fuckin' go.

22

irrelevant, I would submit, under the statute itself to

23

determine whether someone is guilty of witness tampering.

23 : she knows.

The intent to induce someone to withhold testimony and any

24 ;

effort made on - or to induce that person to withhold the

25 i Christine was personally served with a subpoena ordering her

It's not a factor.

It's

:

22

And he

tells Christine to tell Angelina just to, to avoid it all,

Just tell her that.

And that's it and it's done.

And Christine goes, oh, yeah, she knows,

This is again is four days after a hearing at which
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to appear and she didn't go.

During the second part of that

1 j

Defendant reassures her but she, I think, clearly

i
2 | conversation, during the call, the second call that was

2

3 j played, they discuss at some length the past between the two

3 | makes as well as her tone of voice and her reactions to the

of them.

Christine repeatedly expresses concerns about the

5 | defendant's actual behavior.
6 | forgiven anything.

And he tells her she hasn't

She says that he'll say whatever he's got

7 | to because he's in jail.

But when he's out, in front of her

face, and this is when Christine asks, ""What's gonna fuckin'

defendant statements, she recognizes that she is being
manipulated into accepting the defendant back, forgiving him

6

and giving him a second chance.

7 j

And I think that that - witness tampering doesn't

8 j mean that you have to kill the witness.

10 i country.

And the defendant, goes on to, again, discuss

11 j religion.

4
5

It doesn't mean you

9 | have to buy them a plane ticket to leave town, to leave the

9 | happen then?"
10 |

from the questions that she asks and the statements that she

Tells her he's worried about her.

It doesn't mean you have to bribe them.

It means

11 ' that you have to undertake some action to prevent them from

Repeatedly

12 I tells her that he's working out his issues.

12

testifying to cause them to withhold any testimony.

13 I

13

that's exactly what the defendant is doing.

14

manipulating Christine into not providing testimony.

I think, I think its pretty clear that the
defendant's, and I don't know whether he intends the symbols,

And

He's

15

Her decision, obviously, she has a right to do that

And that is what the defendant is asking her for.

16

just like she has, like I said before, a right to leave town.

17 j I think Christine's statements during the last conversation

17

But the defendant is actively participating in planning that.

!

13

He's manipulating her into making decisions.

j

19

with the information, the constitutional provisions that she

15 j but God is about forgiveness.
16 | chances.

Religion is about second

that we listened to make it perfectly clear that Christine
19 [ knows she is being manipulated.

She asks about it because

20 I she doesn't want to be manipulated.
21 j defendant to be being honest.

She wants, she wants the

She recognizes that they have

Providing her

20

needs to quote in telling the Court this.

21

starts to suspect that this may be a scheme on his part just

And when she

22 | a history which means that regardless of what he's saying

22

to get out of jail, he brings up God.

23 | now, if and when he gets out, if they were having the

23

He tells her she's not forgiven him of anything.

He brings up religion.

24 j argument that they had had the night before, she wouldn't

24

25 j feel safe.

25 ; religious, the psychological manipulation in this case that,

So I would submit that the emotional, the

92
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that constitutes witness tampering.

Above all of that, the

defendant every time he called her had to do so in, violation

1

here is whether, whether M s . Zaragoza's invocation of her

2 ; privilege not to testify was due to a wrongful act of the
3 •• defendant.

of the no-contact order.
And I would just note that the section of the Utah
Code, the Co-Habitant Abuse Procedures Act which provides for

5 ;

the issuance of those no-contact orders, it also makes no

6

exception for spouses.

7

Those no-contact orders, it's

irrelevant what the relationship is so long as they're cohabitants - which means anything from the biological parent

And then you enumerated, did he pressure, did he

4 I bribe her, did he use emotional manipulation.
And these, my notes are kind of out of
chronological order and unorganized, but in February 16 th ,
;

first conversation, M r . Zaragoza encourages Christine to

S : think about herself and to stay focused on God no matter what
9

happens to him.

And the second conversation, he encourages

of the other party's unborn child, to roommates, to actual

10

spouses.

11 < getting some counseling in the jail.
The code recognizes the danger of the witness

her to seek counseling.

12

He tells her that, that he's, he's
There was a reference

to John, this fellow that he's been getting counseling from

tampering as well as recidivism, repeat violence, especially

13 ; in jail.

following acts of domestic violence and while other cases are

14 . while he's been in jail for a long period of time.. Its first

pending.

15

And that's exactly why that, the no-contact order

provided for by code in domestic violence situation, domestic

16

violence situations is to protect against exactly this sort

17

of behavior.

18

It's been kind of an awakening for Mr. Zaragoza

time he's realized some of the issues that, that he has.
:

;

its been something that's helpful to him.
awakening for him.

But when she says that she hasn't been

getting counseling, he, he said he wishes she would.

So I'll and I'll just submit it on that.

19 '

MR. WEST: Your Honor, I can only say that Mr.

20 i victim of domestic abuse to get counseling, that is not

Now, I think everybody knows that by encouraging a

Cooley and I view those conversations way differently from

21 '• looking at, that's not Mr. Zaragoza looking out for his

each other.

22 i interest.

And I too want to refer to some of the

And

Its been an

That's not him trying to get her to avoid process

23 '• or to avoid participating in the case against him.

conversations.
I want to go back to the issue as the Court framed
it when we started this hearing.

You said that the issue

24 !

He also indicated - and I'm not sure I noted the

25 : date on this one, but he said that he's learning in groups
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i

that he has to just leave when they were referring, this was

1 ! in the conversations that he's had with, that we've heard

one of the conversations when their voices were raised and

2 | about today.

they were arguing about incidents that had happened in the

3 I and saying that a person is trying to change is emotional

past.

4 ! manipulation.

He said I just have to leave to take a time out.

That's what I'm learning in here.

about how he's changed because of some, some of the things

6 j for something, make them feel like its their fault.

that he's learned.

7 j not anything that Mr. Zaragoza has done in these

That's

8 j conversations.

But again, Mr. Cooley's argument is that you're

9 ;

You know,

I don't think that anything that the Court has

whenever Mr. Zaragoza talks about religion, Mr. Cooley wants

10 • heard or seen today shows that there was a wrongful contact,

to say, Well, that's just manipulation.

11 i or a wrongful attempt to pressure, to bribe, or to otherwise

I'd submit to you

that if you listen to all these conversations that religion

12 ! get Ms. Zaragoza not to do it, not to testify.

has become something important in Mr. Zaragoza's life because

13 ; again, I just, (inaudible) the March 19lJ> conversation he

he knows that he can't change by himself and that's why he's

14 | says, "I don't think they're gonna do anything whether you do

sought help from the counselor in the jail.

15 i or don't."

That's why that

There's no - there's been no pressure.

In fact,

He's not

He's saying, I don't think they're

17 i gonna do anything whether you do or don't.

There's

Well, he's wrong

18 | about that, but he's not telling her what to do.

nowhere in any of these conversations where he says to her,
you know, where he tells her what to do.

That's the opposite of pressure.

16 ; telling her what to do.

he's been learning scriptures and so on.

19 ;

I mean, she

And, Your Honor, the State hasn't proved what it

suggests, well, maybe I should right a letter, he says, sure,

20 ! needs to prove in order to show forfeiture by wrongdoing and

go ahead, do that.

He, he, yeah, he advises her that she can

21 | I would ask the Court to so rule.

seek legal counsel.

But there's nowhere where he's telling

22 \

her what to do.

making them feel like its their fault.

There's none of this

25 ; made in the conversation, but I'm only going to address one

I

96

successful in doing so.

The defendant did not ask Christine for

forgiveness.

I

24 I disagree with Mr. West's representation of the statements

95

of them.

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, I would first remind the

23 ! Court that a preponderance of the evidence (inaudible).

Emotional manipulation is blaming someone else,

The one other note that I would make is that in

When she seemed like she may not, she may be

bringing her up the past, he accused her of not forgiving him

3 j Montague

and said, what happened?

4 j case which I believe is directly on point with this issue.

What happened to all the God?

What

He wasn't asking for forgiveness.
apology.

It was an accusation.

which I still believe is the, it's a Tenth Circuit

5 j The victim invoked her marital privilege at trial and refused

happened to all the religion?

15

The way, the classic way that people

5 I manipulate others is to make them feel guilty for what they,

He talked - he does talk

damned if you do and you're damned if you don't.

14

I, I cannot conceive of how asking forgiveness

It wasn't an

She was doing wrong by not

6 | to testify.

She had testified at a grand jury proceeding

7 ; previously which is not a preliminary hearing, is not an

being forgiving, by bringing up the past and by being weary

8 | adversarial hearing.

of what might happen to her when he gets out of jail, about

9 I testimony at that preliminary hearing should be admitted at

And the question was whether her

being suspicious that maybe, just maybe, all of the

10 | trial.

counseling, all of the treatment, all of the scripture

11 ' consider her testimony at the preliminary hearing.

reading that the defendant has been doing in jail is not

12 I prosecution and the defense agreed on proffer that

actually intended to or succeeding at changing his behavior.

13 j (inaudible) I believe with respect to statements that the

Maybe it's a rouse.

14 j daughter would make about-.

Maybe it just isn't going to work.

Your Honor, these two have been together for a
They've known each other. They've had these

And I think it should be noted that the court did not
The

15 |

THE COURT: - (inaudible) grand jury proceeding?

16 j

MR. COOLEY: Sorry?

17 j

THE COURT: It was a grand jury proceeding, wasn't

16

couple of years.

17

conversations before-

13

calls on the CD that the witness brought today.

19

these few phone calls, they're referencing other phone calls.

19 ;

20

They, I think all three of them in tone, in content are

20 |

THE COURT: Right.

21

generally similar.

21 j

MR. COOLEY: Not an adversarial proceeding.

There are, I don't remember, 270 phone
I think just

And I think that they've clearly

18 j it, in the federal court?

They didn't have a prelim?

MR. COOLEY: No, that's what I'm saying, sorry.

22

established that there was a plan on the defendant's part to

22 j

THE COURT: Right.

23

manipulate his wife into invoking her marital privilege, that

23 j

MR. COOLEY: So there hadn't been an opportunity to

24

he executed that plan using emotion, religion and the

24 | cross-examine.

feelings that his wife still had for him, and that he was

25 j testimony at grand jury proceeding should be admitted at

So, but the question was whether her
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1

trial, and the court didn't consider her testimony at the

1

know the manipulation that the defendant engaged in. The

2 | grand jury proceeding. Which means the court didn't consider

2 I statements that he made regarding the possible penalties with

3 • her saying, he told me if I changed my story I wouldn't get

3 j respect to the crimes. Telling Christine to tell a friend to

4 i in trouble.

4

It didn't consider her saying anything about

just not show up, that gets rid of it.

Instructing Christine

5 i those conversations.

5 j to file an affidavit, to do so before the hearing, before the

6 J

6 I final pretrial.

The court considered the fact that her daughter

So, I think that in this case what the Court has is

7 | would have testified, if called at the evidentiary hearing on

a lot more evidence than the district court had in Montague

8 I the forfeiture issue, the daughter would have testified that
9 | she was scared of the defendant. Evidence would have been
10 i presented that she had visited the defendant.
11 | this communication, this contact.

9 | evidence of manipulation.

She solicited

She visited the defendant

10 j no-contact order than in Montague.

And I think that the

11 j victim's fear of the defendant is evidenced on occasion in

12 ! five times at the jail and there was a history of domestic

12 I those recordings, especially that last one that we listened

13 j violence. And the court said, the district court said and

13 | to where she says, asks what would things be like if you
weren't in jail where he could, just wanted to say whatever

14 | the circuit court clearly approved of this finding, that
15 I based on the history, the fear and the five visits of which

15 | he's got to to get out.

16 ; they knew absolutely nothing in terms of the conversation

16 | what would be happening?

17 i that occurred between them, that the wife's willingness to

17 !

18 ! testify on the one occasion and the invocation of the marital

18 j five minutes, to make sure that my husband got his car,

If he were out in her fuckin' face,

THE COURT: I have to take a break just for like

otherwise, we're gonna be in big trouble, or I'm gonna be in

19 i privilege on the latter, on the second occasion at trial,
;

20

21 j procured her unavailability through wrongdoing - violation of

21 i and then I'll come back and rule, okay.

22 I the no-contact order.

22 j

23 I

23 | the - I kind of figured (inaudible).

Your Honor, I, I think that this case is dissimilar

24 1 only insofar as we do know the content of the conversations.

trouble.

So, I'm gonna step off the bench just for a second

20 ' that that evidence was sufficient to show that he had

25 | We do know the information the defendant provided.

And I, hold on, Mr. Zaragoza, you may need to use

24 j

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

I

We do

25 !
'

99

vs.

California

THE COURT: When we started this hearing, I

j

100

believe that in order to apply the doctrine in this case, the

indicated that it was my understanding and interpretation of
the Court's opinion in PooJe, the Court's opinion in

State has to prove that the wrongful intent to pressure, to

Giles

bribe, to encourage Ms. Zaragoza not to testify is linked to

and the, my understanding of the concept of

forfeiture by wrongdoing or the doctrine of forfeiture by

her indication of the marital privilege.

wrongdoing. And as I was thinking about it and as I have

that is what makes her unavailable, obviously, that is a

been preparing for this hearing, I was of the impression that

pertinent and an important factor.

must have been wrongfully brought to bear by Mr. Zaragoza.

important point here.

That in order to apply the doctrine of forfeiture by

find that the State must prove by a preponderance of the

sorry, it's, I'm tired - the guarantee of confrontation is no

11 ! that, "the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may not be

guarantee at all if it is subject - the right to

12 ! employed to deny an accused his confrontation right absent

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment is one of the most

13 j evidence when committing the crime or other wrongdoing, the

important rights that a criminal defendant has, as he

14 | accused was motivated by the desire to prevent the witness

prepares for trial, as he undertakes to defend at a trial.

15 ! from testifying against him at trial."

Obviously, a conviction based on not only unreliable, but

16 I

non-confronted testimony goes against the very nature of our

17 | tons of evidence given the fact that there were 276 phone

criminal justice system and why we allow evidence in and why

18 | calls made from the jail to Ms. Zaragoza.

we exclude it.

19 : least two visits that we know of at the jail by Ms. Zaragoza.

However, that fundamental right as pointed out by
not only this doctrine, but as recognized by the U.S. Supreme

22

Court and the Utah State Supreme Court, that right can be

23

waived and it, based upon behavior, based upon actions, based

24

upon wrongdoing by a criminal defendant.
I have changed my mind to the extent that I don't

In this case there has been a flood of evidence and

There were at

20 ; That there, more than by a preponderance has it been proven
21 i

that this defendant engaged in witness tampering to attempt

22 ! to induce someone from withholding testimony, change
I somebody's testimony, influence the testimony that may be
23 ;
24 ! given at trial.

i
25

And therefore, I believe and I would

evidence that - let me read, read straight from the case

wrongdoing, in order to, let's see, in order to show that -

21

To the extent that

The fact that she is unavailable is what is the

the, Ms. Zaragoza's decision to invoke the marital privilege

20

-

Numerous, more violations of the

25 ;

I listened to, we all listened to the conversations
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1 j together.

We, we may disagree on exactly what was stated in

1 : and we talked a lot about this - but the whole purpose of

2 j those conversations, but it is fairly clear to the Court

2 | that privilege is to protect the marital institution and to

3 j listening to those conversations that there were; there was

3 ! protect and not do a disservice to the marriage entity
;

plenty of influence; there was plenty of reminders of the

4

past; there were offers of forgiveness; there were

5 !

withdrawals of forgiveness; there was indication after

6 ' be a husband for that matter, it doesn't matter, where the

indication that Mr. Zaragoza is changing, that he's trying to

7 ; spouse has invoked the privilege and the evidence that is

change, that he - frankly, I think he even admitted that he

8 j going to be submitted at trial is, its not the testimony of

made some admissions in the statement that, "you know what I
did" in this case.
to change.
12 j power.

There was discussion about how he's going

There was the indication of God or a higher

In a case like this where the wife has, or it could

9 I the spouse at trial.

It is statements that were made before

10 i the privilege was invoked.

Statements that were made and

11 ! that will be offered and given by a third person I think that
12 : the privilege itself, the purpose of the privilege is

There was discussion of the relationship.

13 j

itself.

13 . somewhat mitigated.

That, those discussions and those instances of

There's a case State

vs.

Burden

14 j witness tampering are a sufficient basis and are sufficient

14 ;

15 j evidence of wrongdoing on Mr. Zaragoza's part.

15 ; Washington case, Washington state case, but there's a quote

I would find

and I know it's a

16 j based upon all the evidence that was provided today, based

16

17 | upon my understanding of the case law and where and why and

17 ; And the Washington Supreme Court stated, "the purpose of the

18 j how this doctrine should be applied is particularly

18

19 j applicable to a case such as this where the only evidence,

19 • prevent discord.

20 | not the only evidence, but the significant evidence of the

20

21 j statements submit, is the testimony of M s . Zaragoza, or the

21

and prevents the testifying spouse from having to choose

22 I victim, in this case.

22

between perjury, contempt of court or jeopardizing the

23 j

23

marriage."

One other point that I wanted to mention, and that

that I think it's particularly appropriate to this situation.

testimonial privilege is to foster domestic harmony and

24

24 | is in a situation like this where the victim or where the
spouse has invoked the marital privilege, the whole purpose -

25

The privilege also reflects the natural

repugnance of having one spouse testify against the other,

"We find the latter two purposes will not be
affected by allowing third-person testimony because the

103

spouse is not testifying in court.

104

This is not a case where

the prosecution called the. spouse to the stand.

So I'm finding - and you're set to go on trial on

If the

Monday with Judge Quinn - that M s . Zaragoza is unavailable.

spouse had testified under those circumstances, the common

Mr. Zaragoza has procured her unavailability, in part, by the

law rule would have been violated.

witness tampering that he has engaged in and that the

step removed from actual testimony.

Here, however, we are one
Therefore, there is no

statements that she made to officer, I think, I believe its

chance that we might be repulsed by a spouse actually

officers who responded on or about June 17^', 2009, are

testifying against his mate.

admissible at trial.

Nor is there a chance that

marital frictions will be aggravated for there is a

MR. WEST: Couple of points of clarification. Your

convenient buffer of the third-person actually making the

Honor.

remarks."

ruling on any substance of any calls that you didn't hear,
I know that goes very, against the very nature of

take into evidence today-

the Sixth Amendment to the, both the U.S. Constitution and

THE COURT: (Inaudible)-

our State Constitution because of the right to confrontation.

13

But when you wrap all of this together, I do believe that Mr.

14

Zaragoza has given up his right to confront his spouse based

And I would allow the State to submit that

evidence through the testimony of other individuals.

I mean, obviously, there was a protective order.

THE COURT: Right.

18

MR. WEST: But I mean as far as trying to persuade
Ms. Zaragoza not to testify.

wrapped up together in the sense of - the reason for not
And

when the defendant by his actions has waived that right, it
would serve no purpose to exclude the statements based upon
the fact that they may be hearsay.

And I don't think that, that you can make a finding

wrongdoing.

And I agree with you, M r . Cooley, that it is

allowing hearsay is because of the confrontation issues.

calls.

17

Certainly, we do have to address the issue, the
hearsay issue.

MR. WEST: - because you did refer to the numerous

based on those calls that they had anything to do with

upon his actions and based upon his tampering of her and her
testimony.

Let me just be assured that you're not basing the

THE COURT: Right.

And I - thank you for that

21

clarification.

No, I am not making my finding based upon the

22

substance of any of those calls that I was not able to listen

23

to and that were not presented.
I am, however, it is significant and I think it is
a fact that is important, the number of phone calls that were
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made from the jail to M s . Zaragoza.
MR. WEST: I understand.

MR. COOLEY: Yes.
But Judge, I just want in

terms of any record that, that we would be dealing with the
4 | calls that were heard.
5 ;

2 !

THE COURT: To lay the foundation, yes.

3

MR. COOLEY: I guess, I guess just to rephrase this,

4

6 j objection which you already addressed.

as far as her statements to the medical providers, the
treating providers there at the hospital as well as the

And then the other question I had was about hearsay

paramedics.

And clearly that,

this is just limited to statements that M s . Zaragoza has

MR. WEST: So you intend to call the providers?

made?

MR. COOLEY: Yes.

9 |

THE COURT: Correct.
MR. WEST: Now-

10

11

THE COURT: - (inaudible) else?

11

12 j

MR. WEST: - is there, are there any other - because

12

10 j

'

MR. WEST: Okay.

9

MR. COOLEY: At this pointMR. WEST: - because I can't cross-examine a
document.

i
13 j I'm not sure exactly what all Mr. Cooley intends to

THE COURT: Certainly.

14 j introduce.

MR. COOLEY: Yeah.

I know there's an 1102 statement and I'm assuming

15 j that you, that there are statements to police officers.

THE COURT: And that is, that is a different, that

Is

16 [ there anything else that I need to be concerned about?

would be a different objection.

17 |

of those statements, there's other- there's other avenues-

MR. COOLEY: The medical records would be the only

18 j additional thing.
19 j

And to the extent that some

MR. WEST: - other hearsay exceptions for statements

There was-

made for purpose of diagnosis if that's where the Court's

MR. WEST: Well, the medical records are a different

going, but still I need to be able to cross-examine the

20 ! sort of hearsay.

witness, not a piece of paper.

21 !

MR. COOLEY: Right.

22 j

MR. WEST: I mean, I think has to-

22

THE COURT: Right.

23 |

MR. COOLEY: - right-

23

MR- WEST: I've seen the piece of paper and I don't

24 !

MR. WEST: - you can't just introduce those.

think that does it, so.

You've

!

THE COURT: Okay.

25 I got to have a witness to testify.
!

103
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order outlining that as, to the best of my understanding,

MR. WEST: Then I would just ask that Mr. Cooley be
required to prepare an order just so we have an order for any

email it to Mr. West and then presumably we, we'll be able to

purposes of appeal-

bring something on Monday morning

MR. WEST: This is a relatively new issue in the
state of Utah, so I think that we need to have an order.
7 ;

5 I

9 I fledged finding of facts and conclusions of law by Monday
10

morning.

11

over the trial, if you could do an order sort of setting

But to help Judge Quinn who's going to be presiding

12 ; forth your understanding of my ruling.
And Mr. West, maybe you can help him

(inaudible)

Thank you.

MR. COOLEY: And would, would Mr. West like me to

6 j prepare a findings and conclusions that

MR. WEST: Right.
9

I mean, I'm not asking that that

happen before trial.

10

MR. COOLEY: Okay.

11 i

MR. WEST: Yeah.

12 !

THE COURT: And I think for trial purposes - would

13 ; you submit findings

(inaudible) - did you submit a proposed

14

and you can put that together together, put that together

14 : jury instructions and?

15

for Judge Quinn on Monday.

15 j

MR. COOLEY: I did. Your Honor.

16 ;

THE COURT: - jury questions?

16 '-.
17

:

And then certainly, depending on what happens at
the trial, obviously, if there is a need for a full-blown

18 | findings of fact and conclusions of law type order, then19
20

MR. WEST: Yeah, I'm not suggesting that that need
to be done before trial.

But if, if there's, if it turns out

(inaudible) assuming

there is a verdict not in his client's favor?

THE COURT: The thing that I think would be helpful

8 : is other, I understand it and I'm not asking you to do a full

13

(inaudible).

THE COURT: Okay, perfect.

THE COURT: Can you do that?

17 |
18
19 i

There's one change-

MR. COOLEY: - as well as a request for discovery
that has been provided to M r . West today.
THE COURT: Okay.

And M r . West it is now

20 I (inaudible)- voir dire questions. I don't know how, Judge-

21 | that there's an appeal in the case, we would have to have a

21 I

22 ; statement.

22 i didn't submit jury instructions yet.

MR. WEST: Your Honor, I provided my voir dire.

I

I anticipate that I may

23 :

THE COURT: You would, you would want that, yes.

23 j submit one, I mean, its not going to be like a full set.

24 •

MR. COOLEY: So just a simple order?

24 j may have one or two instructions just on specific issues of

25 : page and a half of notes (inaudible).

I've taken a

I will write up an

I

25 | law. It kind of depends on how things - what evidence comes
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THE COURT: And then I do, I'll put on the top your
proposed voir dire questions.

THE COURT: Provided that you get another copy.

:i

MS. AYRAPETOVA: All right.

3 |

MR. WEST: So you did receive my voir dire?

THE COURT: ForMS. AYRAPETOVA: - for your record.

4 !

THE COURT: Yes.

»j

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. WEST: Okay.

6 I

MR. COOLEY: We'll get another copy for (inaudible).

!

THE COURT: And I'll put it on the top so that-

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

'i

MR. WEST: Okay.
MR. COOLEY: And then my proposed instructions, the
10

elements instruction for aggravated kidnaping.

I (inaudible)

11

provided them to the Court and (inaudible).

12

I made in ten as well as an additional instruction

13

instructing the jury that I, (inaudible).

The changes that

8

i

10

ii i
12 j
13 j

14

THE COURT: That's (inaudible)?

15

MR. COOLEY: Yes.

14 \

(Inaudible) for aggravated

16

kidnaping and definition instruction for aggravated kidnaping

*7

that accurately reflects the charge. And then the

16 >

(inaudible) Mr. West would have any objection to that

17 i

19 | additional instruction just letting the jury, informing the
j
20 j jury that domestic violence, aggravated assault and domestic

18 •

21 I violence in the presence of a child is charged in the

20 '

22 j instructions (inaudible) information on both felonies.

21 ;

THE COURT: Okay.
24 j

19 j

22 '•

MS. AYRAPETOVA: Your Honor, may we withdraw State's

23 '.

25 j Exhibit 2 (inaudible).
I
Ill
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Th"d Judicial District
J E F F R E Y WILLIAM H A L L (No.
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A T T D R N E Y AT L A W ,
A PROFESSIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY C O M P A N Y
T H E K E A R N S BUILDING, SUITE 82 1
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ATTDRNEY

FOR THE

DEFENDANT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

v.

ALLEGED VICTIM'S MOTION IN
LIMINE AND MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES TO
QUASH SUBPOENA AND OTHER
RELIEF

JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA,

Case No. 091904897

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Defendant.

THE HONORABLE MICHELE M.
CHRISTIANSEN, THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

COMES NOW the alleged victim, Christine Zaragoza, by and through her counsel
of record undersigned, and, pursuant to the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section
28(l)(a)(wherein the rights of a victim "to be treated with fairness, respect, and
dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice
process" are set forth); and, pursuant to Article I, Section 12, (wherein "a wife shall not
be compelled to testify against her husband...") hereby asserts her privilege not to be
compelled to testify against the Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, the alleged

1
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victim's husband in the above captioned matter.
FACTS
1.

The Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, and the alleged victim, Christine

Zaragoza, are husband and wife. See, Affidavit of Christine Zaragoza, attached hereto
as Exhibit 1.
2.

The Defendant, JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA, has been charged by way of

information of crime which has been publicly filed in court.
3.

On or about January 14, 2010, Christine Zaragoza was served with a subpoena

issued by the Salt Lake County District Attorney commanding her to appear at trial on
February 17, 2010 to provide testimony in trial against her husband, the Defendant,
JONATHAN E. ZARAGOZA.
ARGUMENT
1.

Ms. Zaragoza's privilege against testifying is constitutionally protected.
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12, provides that "a wife shall not

be compelled to testify against her husband..." Id. Because Ms. Zaragoza is the wife of
the Defendant, she cannot be compelled to testify against the Defendant.

She

therefore asserts her privilege not to be compelled to testify against the Defendant,
which privilege is constitutionally protected and guaranteed.
2.

Ms. Zaragoza's right to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the

criminal justice process necessitates guashing the subpoena.
Because Ms. Zaragoza cannot be compelled to testify against the Defendant as
set forth above, no good cause exists to subpoena her to trial. Indeed, subpoenaing a
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witness who cannot be compelled to testify serves only to harass and abuse the
witness. Ms. Zaragoza's rights to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the
criminal justice process include her rights to be free from compulsory attendance at
trial wherein she shall not testify.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Ms. Zaragoza respectfully moves this Honorable Court for relief
sought; namely, to recognize the alleged victim's privilege as set forth above and enter
an order quashing the subpoena, thereby relieving her from any duty or obligation to
appear at trial in the above captioned matter.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2010.

/ S / ^whiQAX

WiUiawi

uLaAl

J E F F R E Y WILLIAM HALL,
A T T O R N E Y AT LAW,
ATTDRNEY FDRT H E DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 11 day of
February, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following:
BRAD COOLEY
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
111 E BROADWAY, STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
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EXHIBIT 1
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To Whom It May Concern:

February 11,2010

I Christine Zaragoza am writing this letter in regards to the second subpoena I received
on February 11 2010 requesting my presence as well as my daughter Erica Garcia on
February 12th 2010 at 9:00am act Third District Court. I am honoring my husband and do
not wish to testify against Jonathan E. Zaragoza. I am assisting my marital rights and
wish to leave fate in Gods hands.

Christine Zaragoza

State of Utah
County of *7* H

£*fc<-^)

8

On this (I day of ffo*r>\ in the year 2*J£_, before me
BST-

J

• MONI'H

*

a notary public, personally appeared

J

M*&fc**~>

TE*R— 5 -

prtncc

NO'lAKY PUBLIC NAME
NAME OF UOCUMKKI'frfalfl

proved on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) (is/are)
subscribed to this instrument, and acknowledged (he/she/they) executed the same. Witness my
hand and official seal.

NOTARY PUBLIC

NOTARY PUBLIC
MATTHEW PRINCE
580862
COMMISSION EXPIRES
NOVEMBER 23, 2013
STATE OF UTAH

Judge: Michele Christiansen
Court: 091904897
DA: 09022052
Incident #2009-107177
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OCT 2 5 2010

SALT LAKE COUNTY

DepuiyCieriT

Your Honor, the other matter, given the Court's
ruling that the case is not appropriately merged, I offered
an instruction - should I just read it into the record or do
you —
THE COURT:

Yeah, why don't you do that? That would

make it clear which instruction you're talking about.
MR. WEST:

We offered the following instruction to

allow the jury to consider the issue and that is, "You are
instructed that the law does not allow double punishment for
the same act.

Accordingly, you may not find the defendant

guilty of both a kidnaping charge and an assault charge
unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any detention
of Ms. Zaragoza was independent of and not merely incidental
to any assault of Ms. Zaragoza.

Accordingly, if you find

that Mr. Zaragoza assaulted Ms. Zaragoza over a period of
time, but that he did not detain or restrain her for any
significant period of time, in addition to the time taken up
by the assault, you may not find him guilty of kidnaping."
THE COURT:

All right.

And is that your only

exception to the proposed charge, Mr. West?
MR. WEST:

Yes, Your Honor.

My understanding that

in chambers the instruction with the additional elaboration
of the definition of serious bodily injury is taken out,
right?
THE COURT:

Correct.
219
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UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
Copyright © 2011 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group (TM)
All rights reserved.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT 5
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory
USCS Const. Amend. 5
THE CASE NOTES SEGMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO 8 DOCUMENTS.
THIS IS PARTI.

USE THE BROWSE FEATURE TO REVIEW THE OTHER PART(S).
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and just compensation clauses.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
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UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
Copyright © 2011 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group (TM)
All rights reserved.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT 6
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory
USCS Const. Amend. 6
THE CASE NOTES SEGMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO 10 DOCUMENTS.
THIS IS PARTI.

USE THE BROWSE FEATURE TO REVIEW THE OTHER PART(S).
Rights of the accused.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
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UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
Copyright © 2011 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group (TM)
All rights reserved.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT 14
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory
USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 2ND SPECIAL SESSION AND NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTON
***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 63 (11/16/2010); 2010 UT App 327 (11/18/2010) AND
NOVEMBER 1,2010 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (2011)
§7. [Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
HISTORY: Const. 1896.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 2ND SPECIAL SESSION AND NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTON
***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 63 (11/16/2010); 2010 UT App 327 (11/18/2010) AND
NOVEMBER 1, 2010 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Const. Art. I, §12 (2011)
§12. [Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited
to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2010 2ND SPECIAL SESSION AND NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTON
***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2010 UT 63 (11/16/2010); 2010 UT App 327 (11/18/2010) AND
NOVEMBER 1, 2010 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
PART 4. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2011)
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — Included offenses

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may
be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such
provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both
the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
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evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2.
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